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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores civil-military relations (CMR) challenges to the democratic 
consolidation of the Republic of Maldives. It analyzes the Maldives’ political and 
military history and existing CMR legislation and institutions to determine the strengths, 
weaknesses, and challenges of consolidating a democratic CMR régime in the Maldives. 
 With a long history of authoritarian government, the executive in the Maldives 
traditionally held a monopoly over security and defense. When democratization began in 
2008, the military was required to reform itself to serve not only the executive, but also 
the legislature, judiciary, and the civil society at large. Efforts at democratic reform of 
CMR institutions are currently stalled by inadequate legislation, inappropriate 
configuration of institutions, weak enforcement of judicial decisions, and the lack of 
defense and security knowledge among civilians in the executive and legislature. This 
study concludes that it is crucial for the Maldives to overcome the legislative and 
institutional challenges to enact a democratic CMR régime for a smooth and speedy 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In 2008, the Maldives held its first-ever multiparty election. The incumbent 
president, Maumoon Abdul Qayoom, who had ruled for thirty years, was defeated. A new 
constitution and the formation of a new government in 2008 brought popular changes to 
the political system. Soon after the election, the Maldives was engulfed in the 
pandemonium of democratic transition. Political rallies became a fact of daily life, the 
parliament became dominated by partisan politics, the media was free to report on 
whatever they liked, and state institutions started jockeying for power in the new system. 
At this critical point for consolidating democracy in the Maldives, establishing civil-
military relations (CMR) in accordance with democratic ideals is a crucial and ongoing 
task.  
This thesis explores the civil-military challenges faced by the Maldives in its 
transition from autocratic rule to a democratic system of governance with the ratification 
of the new constitution in 2008. The new constitution initiated a process ending the 
executive’s sole authority over the military, making the military answerable to the 
executive as well as to the legislature, the judiciary, the Auditor General, the Anti-
Corruption Commission and civil society.  
To assess the new distribution of military oversight among the various branches 
of the state and society requires understanding the institutions and legislation of prior 
CMR and how the traditional regime continues to manifest itself in this transition phase. 
Although it has been three years since the ratification of the constitution, little progress 
has been made in changing the military-executive relationship in accordance with the 
constitutional mandate. Reformulating the military-executive relationship in accordance 
with the new distribution of military oversight is important for the institutional 
development of the military and for democratic consolidation.  
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According to democratic consolidation theory, CMR is a vital aspect of 
democratic consolidation.1 Because the Maldives is in the middle of its democratic 
transition, developing a healthy CMR is important for consolidation. Therefore, the key 
question is, what challenges confront the Maldives in enacting a new CMR regime in 
accordance with the 2008 constitution?  To answer this question, this thesis explores the 
history of CMR in the Maldives and the configuration of the current CMR structure to 
determine if the current practices of CMR fit into the norms and best practices of a 
democratizing society. 
Interestingly, civilian control is not the biggest challenge facing the military. The 
Maldives military is faced with the challenge of breaking free from the executive to 
establish a truly democratic CMR régime. Prior to 2008, the military received orders 
from and reported to only the executive, which by definition fulfills the requirement for 
civilian control—the commander in chief is civilian. However, establishing “democratic 
civilian control” requires that the military answer not only to the executive but also to the 
legislature, judiciary, independent institutions, civil society and the public at large.2 This 
thesis looks at the challenges in this transitional endeavor. 
B. STATE, SOCIETY, AND ARMED FORCES IN TRANSITION 
The Maldives has undergone a rapid transformation in all aspects of life. Since the 
opening of the Maldivian economy for tourism in the late 1970s, the GDP per capita  
increased from $271 in 1980, to $8000 by 2010.3 Primary schooling was mandated, and 
the literacy rate increased from 70 percent in 1980, to 98 percent 2012.4 The infant 
mortality rate decreased from 644 per 1000 in 1980, to 78 per 1000 in 2010. Life 
                                                 
1 See Thomas C. Bruneau, “Ecuador: The Continuing Challenge of Democratic Consolidation and 
Civil-Military Relations,”  Strategic Insights 5, no. 2 (2006), 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/11120/bruneauFeb06.pdf?sequence=1.  
2 Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina C. Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization 
and Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization 15, no. 5 (2008), 916. 
3 “GDP Per Capita - Maldives,” The World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?page=6, accessed March, 24, 2012. 
4 “Millennium Development Goals - Maldives ,”  http://www.undp.org.mv/v2/?lid=133, accessed 
April, 19, 2012. 
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expectancy increased from 44 years in 1970, to 77 years in 2010.5 Socioeconomic 
development presents many opportunities and challenges. Most importantly, the 
Maldives faces a number of political and security challenges that warrant a study of CMR 
because the military’s relationship with the government is at the center of meeting these 
challenges. 
With the rapid development of the last few decades, the population started 
demanding more political and democratic reform. Their demands included the freedom to 
form political parties and organize political rallies, freedom of the press, a fully elected 
legislature, and an independent judiciary. In early 2000s, rioting and political rallies 
became commonplace. Under pressure from the élite and civil society, President Qayoom 
announced a political reform process in June 2004.6 In the face of demands from the 
general public, Qayoom called for the election of a constitutional assembly and tasked 
them with writing a constitution to facilitate a multi-party democracy with separation of 
executive, legislative and judicial powers. The aim of the reform process was to 
transform the Maldives from a constitutional autocracy to a multiparty democracy. The 
first phase of the reform effort culminated in the ratification of the new constitution on 7 
August 2008 and the first ever multi-party elections in October of the same year.7 
An important feature of the 2008 constitution is that it abolished the executive’s 
exclusive control of the armed force, a practice that existed for more than a century of 
Maldivian military history.8 The first challenge the military faced was breaking free from 
its long history and transforming itself to be compatible with a democratic system of 
 
 
                                                 
5 “Infant Deaths by Age and Sex, 2003 - 2010,” Ministry of Planning and National Development, 
http://planning.gov.mv/YearBook2011/yearbook/Population/3.11.htm, accessed April, 19, 2012; “Infant 
Deaths by Age and Sex, 1980 - 2003,” Ministry of Planning and National Development, 
http://www.planning.gov.mv/publications/25yearsstats/25stats_tabs.htm, accessed April, 19, 2012; “Life 
Expectancy - Maldives,” The World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN/countries/MV?display=graph, accessed April, 19, 
2012. 
6 Jacob A. Bonofe, “The Challenges of Democracy in the Maldives,” International Journal of South 
Asian Studies 3, no. 2 (2010), 439. 
7 Bonofe, “The Challenges of Democracy in the Maldives,” 439–440. 
8 The Maldives military celebrated its 120th anniversary on 21April 2012. 
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governance. The Maldives military currently faces additional challenges, including 
defining its role in the democratic consolidation process and meeting various internal and 
external security threats.  
There was a short honeymoon period for the new government. With the new-
found freedom of expression granted in the constitution, the public started demanding 
more from the government, forcing the government to use state institutions beyond their 
capacity and at times outside their traditional roles. One of the institutions the 
government relied on heavily was the military—Maldives National Defence Force 
(MNDF). MNDF, one of the oldest state institutions, and least battered by the reform 
process, was tasked by the executive to take an assertive role in a host of government-
mandated activities outside its traditional role. At times, the military was employed for 
policing duties, infrastructure development projects, running government offices, and 
arresting individuals. Some of these roles turned out to be inconsistent with the law and 
the constitution, causing people to question the appropriate use of the military in a 
democratic system.  
In the past decade, radicalization and gang violence have increased. On the 
radicalization front, transnational terrorist groups operating in neighboring countries have 
successfully infiltrated Maldivian society and are recruiting Maldivians for terrorist 
operations. Some recent examples include a radical group exploding a homemade bomb 
in Sultan Park, a tourist attraction in the capital city of Male’, on 29 September 2007, 
injuring a dozen foreigners including British, Japanese and Chinese tourists.9 Soon after, 
a confrontation on the island of Himandhoo on 7 October 2007 between security forces 
and a small radicalized group that rejected state-appointed authorities.10 The arrest of 
nine Maldivians undergoing terrorist training in the tribal region of Pakistan in 2009 
illustrates the growing terrorism threat within the Maldives.11 The participation of a 
                                                 
9 “Sultan Park Bombing is a Deliberate Terrorist Attack: Minister of Home Affairs [in Dhivehi],” 
Haveeru Daily, http://www.haveeru.com.mv/dhivehi/news/52636, accessed February, 24, 2012; “Sultan 
Park Bombing Incident: Some Tourists Released After Treatment [in Dhivehi],” Haveeru Daily, 
http://www.haveeru.com.mv/dhivehi/news/52633, accessed February, 24, 2012. 
10 “Himandhoo Confrontation: Security Forces Arrest 63 People from Himandhoo [in Dhivehi] ,” 
Haveeru Daily, http://www.haveeru.com.mv/dhivehi/news/53064, accessed November, 24, 2012. 
11 “Maldives Releases the Alleged Maldivian Terrorists Arrested in Pakistan [in Dhivehi],” Haveeru 
Daily, http://www.haveeru.com.mv/dhivehi/news/86334, accessed Februrary, 24, 2012. 
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Maldivian national named Ali Jaleel in the suicide attack on Inter-Services Intelligence 
(ISI) headquarters in Lahore, Pakistan, on 27 May 2009, and the subsequent release of a 
video in which Jaleel urged other Maldivians to join the fight, also shows the influence of 
transnational terrorist groups in the Maldives.12  
Furthermore, the last five years have brought an explosive increase in gang-
related crimes. Worrying trends include gang related killings and robberies, along with 
the occasional kidnaping of individuals for money. Police records show that in 2009, 
there were 589 robberies, while in 2011, the number increased to 721. There have been 
about 13 gang related homicides per year for the last three years. These crime statistics 
are extremely high for a country with population of just 350,000.13  
Lastly, the Maldives has witnessed a number of seaborne threats to its security in 
recent years. On 27 March 2012, an Iranian merchant ship with 23 crew members was 
captured by Somali pirates within the Maldivian exclusive economic zone.14 At present 
the security forces have 40 alleged Somali pirates in custody from eight different 
incidents dating back to 2003.15 The pirates were found drifting in territorial waters or 
washed ashore in small dinghies, most likely sent from their mother ship to search for 
hijacking targets. As a vast swath of Maldives territory is unguarded sea, mafia groups 
use it for smuggling operations. Among the most high-profile cases is the 16 May 2007 
discovery in the Maldives waters of the ship Sri Krisna, a gunrunner supplying the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) in their fight against the Sri Lankan 
                                                 
12 Animesh Roul, “Jihad and Islamism in the Maldive Islands “ The Jamestown Foundation, 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36036&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHas
h=f218d5b027, accessed March, 24, 2012. 
13 “Crime Statistics,” Maldives Police Service, http://www.police.gov.mv/statisticscrimes, accessed 
May, 11, 2012. 
14 “Pirates Take the Hijacked Ship Away from Maldives Territory [in Dhivehi],” Haveeru Daily, 
http://www.haveeru.com.mv/dhivehi/news/118983, accessed April, 24, 2012. 
15 “We are Trying to Send 40 Somali Individuals Back: Minister of Defence [in Dhivehi],” Haveeru 
Daily, http://www.haveeru.com.mv/dhivehi/news/128692, accessed October, 15, 2012. 
 6 
 
government.16 The 2008 discovery of waterproof bags containing 1.6 tons of heroin 
hidden in a reef confirms the presence of sea-going drug-related gang activity.17   
Given the current political and security climate in the Maldives, it is imperative 
that the military remain free from domestic partisan politics in order to focus on its 
missions and objectives. It is also important that the military contribute and play a 
positive role in democratic consolidation without compromising its mission, integrity, 
and independence. The best way to mitigate such contradictory demands requires that the 
Maldives avoid a CMR crisis and develop a democratic system of CMR as it moves in 
the consolidation process.  
This thesis aims to contribute on two fronts. First, given the fact that civil-military 
literature on the Maldives is virtually non-existent, this thesis documents and provides an 
academic perspective on the history, formation, and current practices of CMR in the 
country. This historical perspective provides a context for the current situation and a basis 
for understanding and analyzing current CMR challenges. Additionally, since the 
Maldives is one of the smallest countries in the world, the findings of this thesis will 
contribute towards a framework and literature for better understanding the CMR 
challenges unique to democratic consolidation in small and less-developed countries. 
C. PROBLEMS AND QUESTIONS OF CMR IN THE MALDIVES 
Healthy CMR is a crucial element for any consolidating democracy due to the 
unique role entrusted to the military in the transition to democracy. The military is 
required to be an impartial instrument in a situation where its interests are also at stake.  
The Maldives is currently at an important juncture, making this an appropriate 
time to evaluate whether the country is moving forward in establishing a healthy CMR. 
                                                 
16 In this incident, the Sri Krishna fired upon a local fishing vessel and the Coast Guard was called in. 
After a two day standoff, the Coast Guard sank the ship. Investigations revealed that the ship was an Indian 
fishing vessel that was hijacked by the LTTE for smuggling arms. See “An Unidentified Vessel Fires Upon 
a Local Fishing Boat [in Dhivehi],” Haveeru Daily, http://www.haveeru.com.mv/dhivehi/news/46991, 
accessed October, 24, 2012; “Maldives Sinks Suspected Tamil Tiger Vessel [in Dhivehi],” Haveeru Daily, 
http://www.haveeru.com.mv/news/15399, accessed October, 24, 2012. 
17 A local fishing vessel discovered the heroin packed and hidden in the lagoon of Dhiffushi island in 
Male’ Atoll at a depth of 30 meters, on 22 April 2008. Although the perpetrators were never captured, 
investigations established that the drugs were not destined for the Maldives. See “Sacks Containing 
Suspicious Items Found in Lagoon [in Dhivehi],” Haveeru Daily, http://www.haveeru.com.mv/news/9742, 
accessed October, 24, 2012.  
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President Nasheed resigned in a televised event on 7 February 2012, just three years into 
his tenure as the first-ever democratically elected president. The next day he accused the 
military and the police of forcing him to resign, characterizing his resignation as a coup 
orchestrated by the opposition and the security forces. Because the former president 
continued to accuse the security forces of participating in a coup, and since there is no 
independent mechanism to verify the claims, his successor, President Waheed, appointed 
a presidential commission to investigate the events. The commission consisted of five 
members and two independent advisors: four Maldivians (three nominated by the 
government and one nominated by former President Nasheed); three foreign nationals (a 
retired judge of the Singapore Supreme Court as the co-chair, a retired Court of Appeals 
judge from New Zealand nominated by the Secretariat of the Commonwealth to serve as 
a judicial expert, and a Canadian law professor nominated by the United Nations to serve 
as a legal expert. On 28 August 2012, following a six-month investigation, the 
commission concluded that there had been no coup. Rather, Nasheed resigned as a 
consequence of a series of illegal actions taken by the government using the security 
forces. The report also laid blame on the security forces for violating the rule of law and 
human rights.18 
Additionally, three separate investigations by the Human Rights Commission of 
the Maldives concluded that the events leading to the collapse of the first democratically 
elected government include gross violations of the constitution, rule of law, and 
international obligations by the security forces and the executive.19  
How is it that the security forces and the executive violated the constitution and 
the rule of law? Why did President Nasheed accuse the security forces of orchestrating a 
coup? What led to the collapse of cooperation between the military and the civilian 
government? Why couldn’t other state institutions intervene when the president and the 
                                                 
18 Ismail Shafeeu and G.P. Selvam, “Report of the Commission of National Inquiry, Maldives,” 
(Commission of National Inquiry, 2012), 2. 
19 HRCM, “Investigative Report on the Human Rights Violations Occurred During the Events of 6 and 
7 February 2012 [in Dhivehi],” (Male’: HRCM, 2012), 1–70; HRCM, “Investigative Report on the Arrest 
of Criminal Court Judge Abdullah Mohamed by Maldives National Defence Force on 16 January 2012 [in 
Dhivehi],” (Male’: Human Rights Commission of the Maldives, 2012), 1–33; HRCM, “Investigative 
Report on the Human Rights Violation Occurred in Male’ and Addu City on 8 February 2012 [in 
Dhivehi],” (Male’: Human Rights Commission of the Maldives, 2012), 1–43. 
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security forces violated the rule of law and constitution? The answers to these questions 
are found in the past and current civil-military relations. 
With only three years of democratic consolidation behind it—and questions about 
the breadth and depth of reform swirling around the first president’s resignation—the 
Maldives faces a number of unsettling questions with regards to CMR. What is the real 
CMR in the country? Does the current state of CMR in the Maldives fit the norms and 
best practices of a democratizing society? Does the Maldivian state have civilian control 
of the armed forces? What are the challenges to reconstituting and properly defining 
CMR in accordance with the new constitution? What oversight institutions are needed to 
monitor the behavior of the military? Is the military a professional organization? 
This thesis hypothesizes that the Maldives’ history of authoritarian governance, 
sole control of the military by the executive, and the institutional configuration of CMR 
institutions together make it unusually difficult to reconstitute CMR in the Maldives. 
More specifically, due to the lack of appropriate legal frameworks and institutional 
capacity within the CMR institutions the military is unable to break from its past single-
stakeholder mentality to become subservient to the legally enacted control and oversight 
institutions.  
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis consists of six chapters. The introductory chapter establishes the 
importance, theoretical framework and methodology of the thesis. Chapter II and Chapter 
III provide the context and historical roots. Chapter II provides a brief overview of the 
political history and political developments leading up to the democratic transition. 
Chapter III provides the corresponding military history of the Maldives. Together, these 
two chapters identify the antecedent conditions that gave rise to the present CMR régime 
in the Maldives. 
Chapter IV is divided into three parts. It analyzes and discusses the variables of 
democratic civilian control: institutional control, oversight, and professionalism. As part 
of institutional control, the Ministry of Defence and National Security (MoDNS), 
National Security Council (NSC), National Security Advisor (NSA) and parliamentary 
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committees are analyzed. As part of oversight, the type and nature of executive oversight, 
parliamentary oversight, judicial oversight and the role of the media are discussed. In 
considering professionalism, the chapter looks into recruitment, training and promotion 
of the military officer corps. This chapter provides a snapshot of the current system of 
CMR, together with its strengths and weakness. 
Chapter V discusses the systemic CMR challenges the country faces. Chapter VI 
provides the conclusion and recommendations for restructuring and overcoming the 
current challenges faced by the Maldives in CMR reformulation.  
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Democratic transition and its discontents are a new phenomenon to the Maldives, 
so there is no specialist literature on democratic consolidation or CMR in relation to 
Maldives. The lack of published literature on Maldives is also due to the fact that the 
country was under autocratic rule until 2008, so publication of materials critical of the 
government was taboo. Consequently, the Maldives lacks well-established research 
institutes and peer-reviewed journals.  
A search for literature on democratization and CMR specific to Maldives in 
popular international journals—Armed Forces and Society, Journal of Democracy, 
International Journal of Inclusive Democracy—does not reveal any publications. 
Similarly, a search in the academic data bases yields minimum research. Therefore, this 
thesis draws from the general CMR and democratization literature to formulate a 
framework for analysis.  
1. Defining CMR 
“Civil-military relations” means different things to different scholars. CMR is 
often defined as a professional relationship and interaction between the officer corps and 
the civilian leaders;20 a relationship between the armed forces and the society;21 a 
                                                 
20 Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations  (Massachusetts: Havard University Press, 1957). 2–3; Morris Janowitz, The Professional 
Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait  (Illinois: Free, 1960). 7–13, 
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mechanism of preventing coups and maintaining civilian supremacy over the armed 
forces.22 The existence of varying explanations as to what CMR constitutes is due the 
fact that researchers of different fields see the phenomenon of CMR through different 
lenses.23 For the purpose of this study, CMR is defined as a process of interaction 
between the armed forces and various state institutions (executive, legislative and judicial 
actors) and non-state institutions (NGOs, media and the civil society) within a country.24 
This definition is selected because it provides a holistic approach to CMR. 
2. The Civil-Military Challenge 
The challenge of CMR arises from what Peter Feaver terms the “civil-military 
problematique”—the dilemma that a military powerful enough to defend a state is also 
powerful enough to take it over.25 In other words, the rationale of CMR is that the 
military must protect the polity from enemies while not harming the society it is tasked to 
protect.26 While the civil-military problematique is an overarching paradox for any 
democratic society, for consolidating democracies, it presents additional challenges. 
First, as most countries begin their journey to democracy, there is a colossal 
demand to reconstitute all state institutions, including the military, according to 
democratic ideals. Second, the democratizing phase itself is chaotic and is often plagued 
with unregulated infighting between the various branches of government, political 
parties, independent institutions, and media, all trying to maximize their share of power 
in the new system.27 In the absence of a clear arbiter to manage the infighting, it is often 
                                                                                                                                                 
21 James Burk, “Morris Janowitz and the Origins of Sociological Research on Armed Forces,” Armed 
Forces & Society 19, no. 2 (1993): 178–79; David R Segal, “Civil-Military Relations in the Mass Public,” 
no. 1 (1975), 228. 
22 Jendayi Frazer, “Conceptualizing Civil-Military Relations during Democratic Transition,” Africa 
Today 42, no. 1/2 (1995), 40. 
23 Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 2(1999), 211. 
24 “Civil-Military Relations: USAID’S Role,”  in Technical Publication Series (Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Global Programs, Feild Support and Research, U.S. 
Agency for International Development, 1998), 2–3. 
25 Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” 214. 
26 Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntingdon, Janowitz, and the Question of 
Civilian Control,” Armed Forces & Society 23, no. 2 (1996), 152–53. 
27 Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and 
Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies  (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2003), 18. 
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the military that is called upon to be an impartial player, independent arbiter, or power 
broker in the consolidation phase of democracy. The challenge for the military is that it 
has to be independent at the same time fight for its institutional power and resources. 
Furthermore, in addition to being tasked to serve as arbiter, the military often must 
assume additional nontraditional missions (such as policing and internal security duties 
and nation building) which may be detrimental to CMR.28 Depending on the level of 
instability and the length of the democratizing phase, there can be lasting consequences 
for CMR and the health of national democratic institutions. Therefore, it is vital for any 
consolidating democracy to begin developing CMR consistent with democratic ideals 
while managing the chaos of the democratic transition.  
The Maldives, as a consolidating democracy, currently faces the dilemma 
discussed above. As there is virtually no published material on the CMR of the Maldives, 
we must look elsewhere for an appropriate analytical framework to identify CMR 
challenges. At the same time, there is a need to understand how the current relationship 
developed historically. Therefore, the challenge is two-fold: identifying factors that 
contributed to the development of existing CMR, and finding a path to reconstitute and 
stabilize CMR in a democratizing setting such as the Maldives. 
3. Civil-Military Frameworks for Analysis 
While the study of the relationship between the armed forces and the state is an 
old tradition, the beginning of CMR as a separate field of study is generally attributed to 
Samuel P. Huntington’s 1957 book The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of 
Civil-Military Relations.29  Huntington proposes the concept of “objective control” as the 
mechanism for improving civilian control and preventing any threat from the military to 
the society. According to Huntington, the heart of objective control is military 
professionalism. To achieve professionalism, civilian leaders must recognize the military 
as a separate profession and must refrain from intrusive meddling into military affairs.30 
                                                 
28 Cawthra and Luckham, Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security 
Establishments in Transitional Democracies, 19–25. 
29 Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” 212. 
30 Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 82–86. 
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In short, Huntington’s argument rests on a causal chain, which assumes that “autonomy 
leads to professionalization, which leads to political neutrality and voluntary 
subordinations, which leads to secure civilian control.”31  Huntington’s theory dominates 
the field of CMR, and scholars and practitioners continue to use the objective control 
mechanism to explain and conceptualize CMR. 
When the third wave of democratization started with the emergence of states from 
colonial rule and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became clear that Huntington’s 
assertion of objective control alone was not enough to maintain a healthy CMR. The vast 
number of coups d’etat in democratizing countries—the ultimate breakdown of CMR—
forced CMR theorists and practitioners to give further thought to CMR.32 With the field 
of CMR dominated for so long by Huntington’s theory, there has been very little 
theoretical development outside the lines of Huntington’s work.33 For this reason, 
researchers have not produced enough solid theoretical frameworks for politicians and 
practitioners to analyze and develop CMR in democratizing societies.34  
The biggest problem is that the early CMR research is based primarily on mature 
democracies. These works do not capture the new dimensions experienced by the military 
in consolidating democracies and the complexities that arise due to the role played by 
militaries in the democratizing phase. Politicians in developing countries noticed the 
frequency of coups in the third wave of democratization and began looking for ways to 
maximize civilian control of the armed forces.35 Countries have made progress in control 
aspects at the expense of efficiency and effectiveness of the military: enacting laws and 
amending their constitutions for the sole purpose of controlling the armed forces, thus 
 
                                                 
31 Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntingdon, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian 
Control,” 160. 
32 “Coups Since 2000,” Inforplease, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0933947.html, accessed May, 
08, 2012. 
33 Paul Bracken, “Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations,” in U.S. Civil-Military Relations In Crisis 
or Transition?, ed. Don M Snider Miranda A Carlton-Crew (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & 
International Studies, 1995), 145. 
34 Rebecca L. Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance,” Armed 
Forces & Society 22, no. 1 (1995), 10–14. 
35 Frazer, “Conceptualizing Civil-Military Relations during Democratic Transition,” 39. 
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essentially legislatively handicapping the armed forces. Some countries underfund the 
armed forces as a control measure, making their militaries virtually ineffective for 
national defense.36   
Because most military coups occur in emerging or newly democratized countries, 
in the last two decades CMR theorists began focusing more on emerging democracies 
and a new body of literature developed. This literature rejects the idea that 
professionalism is the only variable that underlies CMR, and includes a number of other 
institutional control mechanisms. The new literature also tries to correct the tendency to 
overemphasize control in the management of CMR. The most important aspect of the 
recent literature is the effort to conceptualize a solid framework for analyzing and 
developing CMR that can be applied to democratizing as well as to already democratized 
societies.37 
A noteworthy work with regard to consolidating or newly democratized countries 
is the work by Bruneau and Matei. According to the authors, in democratizing societies 
the role of military is very different from its traditional function. Given the enormous 
demands made on the state during the process of democratization, and especially when 
the military in a democratizing society is not actively engaged in armed conflict, the state 
may employ its armed forces in uncharted territories. This carries the potential for 
damaging the military’s professionalism and its primary mission.38 According to Bruneau 
and Matei, militaries in developing countries undertake six major categories of mission:   
(1) Fight and be prepared to fight external wars, (2) fight and be prepared to fight 
internal wars, (3) fight global terrorism, (4) fight crime, (5) provide support for 
humanitarian operations, (6) prepare for and execute peace support operations.39 
 
                                                 
36 Cawthra and Luckham, Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security 
Establishments in Transitional Democracies, 16. 
37 See Bruneau and Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military 
Relations,”; James Burk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society 29, 
no. 1 (2002), 1–3. 
38 Thomas C Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei,  in Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, ed. 
Thomas C Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (Routledge 2012), 2. 




In addition to contextualizing the dynamics of the military missions in 
democratizing societies, the authors draw on their experience to propose a framework for 
developing CMR in newer democracies. The framework focuses on three major 
components:  democratic civilian control of the armed forces, the effectiveness of the 
security forces fulfilling their mission, and the efficiency in the use of resources. The 
following diagram conceptualizes the argument by the authors.40  
 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework for analyzing civil-military relations (Bruneau and 
Matei, 2008) 
This thesis uses this framework as the theoretical basis for its analysis. It is selected 
first, for its simplicity, and second, for its utility and applicability to the Maldives as a 
consolidating democracy. 
                                                 




E. THE MALDIVES AS A CMR CASE STUDY 
This thesis adopts a single case study method as the research design and uses 
theory testing and institution analysis as the analytical approach to identify and discuss 
the challenges the Maldives faces in reconstituting its CMR. Case study research design 
is ideal because the methodology enables an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon under 
study.41 Hence, a case study permits an in-depth look at the CMR institutions and 
legislation in the Maldives. In addition, as the analysis of CMR calls for understanding 
the social dynamics of the CMR institutions, a case study is appropriate as it allows 
understanding of social process in organizations.42 The country’s challenges are 
documented by an in-depth inquiry into the social dynamics of CMR in the Maldives and 
an analysis of CMR institutions using the CMR framework selected in the literature 
review. The following diagram conceptualizes the approach taken in this thesis.  
 
 
Figure 2. Concept diagram of the thesis 
The diagram should be read as follows: 
Following a long history of authoritarian governance (C), democratization of 
CMR (IV) requires changes to institutional control (Int V1), oversight mechanisms (Int 
V2), and professional norms (Int V3) to achieve effective and efficient civilian control 
 
 
                                                 
41 Thomos W Lee, Using Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research  (London: Sage 
Publication, 1999), 54. 
42 Jean Hartley, “Case study research,” in Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in Organizational 
Research, ed. Catherine Cassell and Gillian Symon (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 323.  
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(DV). This study focuses on analyzing the antecedent conditions and the intervening 
variables to determine how it has affected the independent and the dependent variable in 
the Maldives. 
In the absence of the published CMR literature on Maldives, this thesis uses 
government publication, websites, organizational documents, policy papers, reputed 
newspapers to understand the CMR dynamics in the Maldives. This thesis also draws 
from the general CMR literature and CMR studies of other countries for theoretical and 
conceptual parallels to the Maldives.  
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II. POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE MALDIVES 
Settlements in the Maldives date back about two millennia. In the last several 
centuries, the political system of the Maldives has gone through two distinct phases: an 
era of monarchy and an era of republican government. The written history of Maldives 
began in 1153 A.D. after King Theemuge Maha Kalaminja (later named Sultan 
Muhammad bin Abdullah or famously referred as Dharumavantha Rasgefaanu) accepted 
Islam and declared it to be the religion of the Maldives.43 Prior to his conversion, the 
monarchs were called kings or queens. After the conversion, the monarchs were referred 
to as sultans and sultanas.44 The Maldives has been ruled by a sultan until 1968 when it 
became a republic, except for 17 years of Portuguese rule in the 1500’s and brief period 
of president rule in 1953.45   
Even though Maldives established its second republic with a presidential system 
of government, the elements of monarchical rule remained part of the governing system. 
The president had absolute power on all matters involving the executive and judiciary, 
and had considerable influence in the legislature. This system continued until the 
Maldives established a democratic system in 2008. Despite its democratic consolidation, 
centuries of monarchical rule and the authoritarian presidency continue to shape the 
political and CMR landscape of the Maldives. 
A THE CONSULTATIVE MONARCHY 
The earliest history of monarchical rule is not clearly defined in the Maldives’ 
written history. Documents dating back to the twelfth century describe a system that 
resembles a consultative monarchy.46  Political power was vested with the monarch, who 
                                                 
43 Mohamed Ameen Didi, Moments of Maldives History [in Dhivehi]  (Male’: Novelty Press, 2002), 
35–37. King Theemuge Maha Kalaminja  changed his name to Sultan Muhammad bin Abdullah, and is 
most often known as Dharumavantha Rasgefaanu. 
44 H.C.P. Bell, The Maldive Islands: Monograph on the History, Archaeology and Epigraphy  
(Colombo: The Ceylon Government Press, 1940), 19.    
45 Clarence Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands  (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1980), 188–195. 
46 “Constitutional History,” Permanent Mission of Maldives to the United Nations, 
http://www.un.int/maldives/histcon.htm, accessed August, 25, 2012. 
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appointed committees of advisors to help him run state affairs. The following diagram 
summarizes the monarchical system of governance. 
 
Figure 3. Political structure of early sultanate (Permanent Mission of Maldives to 
the United Nations, 2012) 
According to the historical record, the monarch’s advisory system was made up of 
three councils, the First Council of the Realm (Raskamuge Is Majlis), the Second Council 
of the Realm (Raskiamuge Dhevana Majlis) and the Third Council of the Realm 
(Raskamuge Thinvana Majlis).47  
 
                                                 
47 Department of Information and Broadcasting, Maldives Constitutional History  (Male’: Department 
of Information and Broadcasting, 1990), 5. 
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 The First Council of the Realm, the most senior among the three, consisted of the 
Sultan, the Chief Justice and the Sultan’s closest confidants, mostly family 
members. The function of this council was advising the sultan on important 
issues. 
 The Second Council of the Realm consisted of members of the first council and 
representatives from the four administrative divisions of the capital along with 
members appointed by the king to oversee vital functions of the government. The 
representatives appointed to run bureaucratic functions were divided into two 
groups. The first group includes the officers in charge of the home and provincial 
affairs, defense, public works, and foreign affairs, navy and trade. The second 
group included the officers in charge of finance and revenue, health, war office, 
the second in command of the navy, and the sultan’s private secretary.   
 The Third Council of the Realm consisted of members of the second council, the 
officers in charges of the four gun forts (Badi Koshi), and the officers in charge of 
the five martial arts regiments (Kulhi Koshi). 
Although there was an elaborate system of consultative committees, and what appears to 
be an organized system of governance, the transfer of power in the Maldives was not 
smooth and at times was filled with violence. History is rife with sultans deposed by 
coups, and counter coups orchestrated by family members of the monarch and other 
powerful clans and dynasties.48  The lack of continuity in the transfer of power explains 
why, although technically a hereditary monarchy, the Maldives history includes 94 
monarchs from six different dynasties. 
The Maldives maintained a formidable military capable of defeating or fending 
off foreign powers like the Portuguese and the Malabar kingdoms from the fifteenth 
century until the country signed a protectorate agreement with British on 1887.   One of 
the most interesting observations with regard to CMR in the era of consultative monarchy 
is that despite sometimes chaotic power transfers, the military never took over the polity, 
and the Maldives never had a military dictatorship. On the other hand, the large number 
of appointees in the councils relevant to the military shows that the monarchs co-opted 
                                                 
48 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 198–195. 
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the military leadership. It was beneficial for the military to maintain the status quo and 
leave the political infighting for the monarchs and their families. The most likely reason 
for the absence of a military dictatorship is that in the monarchy, military benefits were 
sustained by whoever was in power irrespective of how they came to power. 
Additionally, because the councils included the monarch’s family members and close 
friends, the monarchs could keep the military under strict control.   
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY AND THE FIRST REPUBLIC 
The Maldives experienced a volatile political period between 1930 and 1952, 
during the constitutional monarchy and the first republic. The requirement for a 
constitutional monarch grew out of a conflict among the family members of the sultan 
Mohamed Shams-ud-deen regarding the succession to the throne. This issue resulted in a 
conflict between the sultan and his chief minister Abdul Majeed Rannabandeyri 
Kilegefaanu, who was married to the king’s sister.49 The British, with an interest in 
Maldives, got involved and indirectly forced the sultan to write a constitution.50  
An agreement signed on 16 December 1887 between the British Crown and the 
sultan specified that the Maldives would become a British protectorate. The terms of this 
agreement dictated that the Maldives relinquish all matters relating to international 
relations to the British, who in return left all domestic affairs to the sultan.51 The process 
of writing the constitution began in 1931with a visit by the acting governor general of 
Ceylon, Sir Bernard Henry Bourdillon.52  The governor met with the sultan and his close 
associates and urged them to write a constitution stipulating the mechanism for 
succession to the throne. Sultan Shams-ud-deen appointed a committee of 12 elites to 
                                                 
49 The People’s Majlis, Law History of Maldives [in Dhivehi]  (People Majlis, 1981), 14. 
50 The People’s Majlis, Law History of Maldives [in Dhivehi], 14–15. 
51 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 128. 
52 The People’s Majlis, Law History of Maldives [in Dhivehi], 17–18. 
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write the constitution.53 The prime minister, Abdul Majeed, was appointed to chair the 
committee. The British administration in Ceylon was heavily involved in making 
suggestions about the content of the constitution. 54  
When the constitution was finished, it made the sultanate into an elected position 
and transferred most of the executive powers to the prime minister. It also created a two 
house system—the people’s council (People’s Majlis) and legislative council (Ganoon 
Hadhaa Majlis). People’s Majlis consisted of forty-four members elected for a one-year 
term from different administrative regions of the Maldives. The legislative council 
consisted of 28 members, of which 17 were appointed from the People’s Majlis, seven 
members were appointed by the sultan, and four members were appointed from the four 
districts of Male’.55  
An important aspect of the constitution related to the security of the Maldives. 
The constitution clearly stated that the Maldives would not have “any dealings with a 
foreign country other than the British” and named the Maldives a “tribute paying British 
protectorate.”56 The constitution did not stipulate any role or mission for the military.57  
As this constitution was created mainly to address a power struggle between 
elites, the constitution strengthened the power of the prime minister at the expense of 
sultan and further diluted the power of the sultan through the legislative bodies. It was 
alleged that the British wanted the prime minister to hold more authority because they 
found it easier to deal with him.58 
                                                 
53 The committee appointed to write the first constitution included the following individuals: (1) Al-
amir Abdul Majeed Rannabanderi Kilegefaanu (2) Al-amir Ahmed Dshimeynaa Kilegefaanu (3) Al-amir 
Ali Kuda Rannananderi Kilegefaanu, (4) Al-gazee Hussain Salaahudeen Untthama Fandiyaaru 
Manikufaanu (5) An-nabeel Mohamed Didi (6) Al-amir Mohamed Fareed Didi (7) Ibrahim Manippulu (8) 
Al-faalil Hussain Hilmy Didi (9) Al-faalil Ibrahim Ali Didi (10) Al-faalil Ahmed Kaamil Didi (11) Al-
sheikh Ibrahim Rushdy Al-azharee, (12) Al-sayyid Abdullah Doshi Seedee.   See The People’s Majlis, Law 
History of Maldives [in Dhivehi], 12. 
54 Mohamed Ameen, The Constitutional History of the Maldives [in Dhivehi]  (Male’: Novelty Press, 
2003), 29–31. 
55 The People’s Majlis, Law History of Maldives [in Dhivehi], 61–62. 
56 Constitutional Assembly, Constitution of Maldives [in Dhivehi]  (Maldives Gazette 1932), 7. 
57 Constitutional Assembly, Constitution of Maldives [in Dhivehi], 6–7. 
58 The People’s Majlis, Law History of Maldives [in Dhivehi], 13–31. 
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The new system under the first constitution was not very stable and did not last 
long. In 1934, Sultan Shams-ud-deen was accused of violating the constitution and was 
replaced with Sultan Nur-ud-deen.59 In the Maldives there was a tradition that if the 
public wanted to protest some matter, they gathered in the arena called Gulaha Kulhey 
Fashgandu and forwarded their demands. With enough popular support, their demands 
were respected by the rulers. Seven years into the constitutional monarchy, on 30 January 
1940, a mob gathered in the Gulaha Kulhey Fashgandu, tore up the constitution, and 
declared it inapplicable to the situation of Maldives at the time. A new constitution was 
adopted in 1942. However, again by popular demand, Sultan Nur-ud-deen was declared 
unfit and was deposed by the People’s Majlis.60  
Then a well-respected royal élite, Majid Didi, was elected as sultan. He was 
residing in Colombo, and never returned Maldives to assume power, staying in Colombo 
until his death in 1952.61 During this period, affairs of state were run by the chief 
minister, the British educated aristocrat Mohamed Amin. Following the death of the 
sultan elect, the People’s Majlis chose Amin as the next sultan. He rejected the offer, 
telling the parliament that if he was to govern the country he would want to establish a 
republic, and asking that a referendum be put to the general public. The referendum was 
held and Amin was elected as the first President of the Maldives on 1 January 1953 by 96 
percent of the votes (the participants of the referendum were limited to the residents of 
Male’ and the locals on ships anchored in Male’ Harbor at that time). Subsequently Amin 
enacted a new constitution giving him unprecedented powers.62 
Nine months into his presidency, while on an official visit to Sri Lanka, Amin’s 
vice president Ibrahim Didi orchestrated a coup and overthrew him. Amin unknowingly 
returned to Male’, and was arrested and detained on a nearby island. With the help of few 
supporters, he secretly landed on Male’ and entered the Security Force Headquarters 
 
 
                                                 
59 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 200. 
60 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 200. 
61 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 200. 
62 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 201. 
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looking for support. A mob stormed the premises, dragged him out, and beat him 
severely. He was tried and banished to a nearby island, where, he died from his injuries 
on 19 January 1954.63  
The country was run by a council elected by the People’s Majlis until 7 March 
1954, after which the republic was abolished and the sultanate reestablished. Mohamed 
Fareed Didi was designated as sultan. In 1957, he appointed Ibrahim Nasir as the prime 
minister. Nasir has been involved in many triumphs and controversies in the political 
history of Maldives. His major legacy is that he negotiated with the British to end the 
1887 treaty and grant full independence for Maldives on 26 July 1965.64 
From the first constitution through the initial days of the second republic was a 
volatile political period. Beginning in 1887 and the protectorate agreement with British, 
the military became increasingly irrelevant, eventually deteriorating into an extremely 
weak ceremonial force with no clear mandate or legislation governing its tasks, roles and 
mission. Therefore, during the political infighting among the royal elites, the military was 
forced to remain on the sidelines as a spectator.  
C. THE SECOND REPUBLIC 
When the British relinquished authority over the Maldives, the People’s Majlis 
announced a referendum to decide the nation’s political future. For a second time the 
public decided to establish a republic. A new constitution was drawn up and Ibrahim 
Nasir was elected to serve a four-year term as the first president of the Second Republic 
on 11 November 1968. Under the constitution, political power was vested with the 
president, the prime minister, the cabinet, and the People’s Majlis.65 
In 1972, the constitution was amended to extend the term of president to five 
years and to provide for the election of the prime minister by the Majlis. Nasir was 
elected for a second term in 1973 and the Majlis elected Ahmed Zaki as the prime 
minister. However, after an alleged attempted coup against Nasir, Zaki was arrested and 
                                                 
63 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 200–201. 
64 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 201. 
65 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 201. 
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banished to a remote island. Consequently, the constitution was further amended in 1975 
to abolish the post of the prime minister and consolidate all power in the hands of the 
president.66 While the Maldives was technically a republic, the constitution did not 
provide for a democratic system of government. There was no separation of powers. 
There was no independent judiciary. The legislature was extremely restricted by the 
overwhelmingly powerful president. Political parties were not allowed. The republic 
wore the features of a monarchy.  
Following ten years of oppressive and autocratic rule by President Ibrahim Nasir, 
Maumoon Abdul Qayoom was appointed as the second president on 11 November 1978. 
The political structure and authoritarian system of government continued throughout his 
30-year rule even though Qayoom enacted a new constitution in 1997. Until 2003, power 
was so centralized that the executive held the portfolios of the president, commander in 
chief, the minister of finance and minister of defence. Also, the president was the 
supreme authority for judicial review and had the power to appoint eight members in a 
52-member legislature.  
Additionally, legislators were not forbidden to hold dual jobs, most government 
ministers ran for legislative seats and got elected. As a result, the executive had almost 
total control of all three branches of government until the 2008 constitution.  
Between 1932 and 2008, the Maldives enacted seven different constitutions, most 
between 1932 and 1978, and enacted major amendments to five of the seven (the 
exceptions are the 1997 and 2008 versions).67 This highlights the volatile nature of the 
political situation in the Maldives at the end of monarchy and in the early years of the 
republic. 
D. DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN THE MALDIVES 
The pressure for real political reform started in early 2000 although the 
government refused to allow wide-ranging political reform until late 2004. The debate 
over political reform came to light in early 2001 when a group of 42 political and 
                                                 
66 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 202. 




business elites submitted a petition to register a political party to the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, which is mandated to register civic organizations The matter was sent to the 
People’s Majlis, which rejected the proposition overwhelmingly—43 out of 52 opposed 
it.68   
However, the signatories of the petition kept up their demand that the government 
allow political parties. At the same time, the elite reformers mobilized and captured the 
imagination of the youth, who had not seen a president other than President Qayoom.69 
Under pressure from the populace, Qayoom announced sweeping political reforms on 
June 2004 with the main goal of developing a multiparty democracy and a new 
constitution with a separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches. The issue of political parties was again referred to the People’s Majlis, but this 
time an overwhelming majority (46 out of 52) voted to allow the formation of political 
parties.70 The first phase of the reform effort culminated in 2008 with the ratification of a 
new constitution on 7 August and the first ever multi-party elections on 8 and 28 October. 
These democratic reforms brought unprecedented changes to the political system. 
They effectively ended the unrestrained power of the president and established the 
institutions of the executive, legislature and the judiciary with separation of powers. The 
new system further diluted political power by providing for an independent elections 
commission, judicial service commission, civil-service commission, anti-corruption 
commission, auditor general, and prosecutor general.  
 
The following table summarizes the structure of political power in the Maldives’ 
different political systems. 
                                                 
68 “Formulation of Political Parties in the Maldives [in Dhivehi],” Elections Commission of the 
Maldives, http://www.elections.gov.mv/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15&Itemid=8, 
accessed May, 18, 2012. 
69 The idea of political reform got traction when a drug offender named Evan Naseem died from a 
police beating in Maafushi Prison. As the news spread, prisoners started rioting, set fire to the cells, and 
attempted to take the prison armory. Security forces opened fire, killing 3 inmates and injuring 20. In 
response, rioting began in the capital, a number of police stations were torched, and security installations 
and government offices were damaged. The incident galvanized the public, and demands for political 
reform and rioting against the government became common in major population centers (President’s 
Office, 2004). 









































































President/Courts Very restricted 
Operated with 















Table 1.   Institutions of political power in different political eras (The People’s 
Majlis, 1998) 
From the discussion and the table above, it is evident that the Maldives’ political 
system was very much executive-centered and therefore did not allow adequate room for 
the development of a system of democratic CMR. This dynamic is further underscored in 
the Maldives’ military history, discussed in the next chapter.  
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III. MILITARY HISTORY OF THE MALDIVES 
The Maldives has long maintained a military. As an island nation at the 
intersection of the east-west trade route, the Maldives faced continuous threats from both 
pirates and the kingdoms of South India. Its oldest known copper book, the Isdoo 
Lomaafaanu from 1194, describes a Maldives king who can muster an enormous army to 
protect a hundred thousand islands.71  
The early military was born from colonial threats and wars with kingdoms in the 
Indian coast. The Maldives’ military history went through two distinct periods: a citizen-
soldier military organization in the early days, and a professional military organization 
that developed in the late nineteenth century. Despite the Maldives’ volatile political 
history, the military never took over the polity. At first the military was busy fighting 
foreign invaders and did not have time to get involved in politics. From the late 1800s 
until the 1980s, the rulers purposely kept the military weak so it would not become a 
threat to them.   
A. SOUTH INDIAN THREATS 
Well into the eighteenth century, South Indian kingdoms posed a security threat to 
the Maldives. The threat took two forms:  Indian kings trying to expand territory for 
economic gain, and deposed Maldivian kings offering tribute to India in exchange for 
their help regaining the throne. The first recorded war is an operation conducted by the 
Maldivian king in 1120 to regain control of two northern atolls that had been captured by 
an Indian king.72  
In the 1400 and 1500s, the Malabar kingdom on the Indian coast had several wars 
with the Maldives. The Malabar intervention began when the deposed sultan Kalhu 
Muhammad requested help from Kannanur Ali Rajaa of Malabar. Ali Rajaa sent a fleet of 
                                                 
71 The reference to a hundred thousand islands is probably because there was no way to count the 
more than 1100 Maldives islands in medieval times. 
72 Jaufar Abdul Rahmaan, Maldives Military History 1 [in Dhivehi]  (Girifushi: MNDF Non-
Commissioned Officers Academy, 2010), 6. 
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soldiers and reinstated Kalhu Mohamed as the sultan in 1494. He was deposed again in 
1510 and came back, again with the help of Ali Rajaa, two years later.73 
During the 1512 voyage, Ali Raja’s ships were captured by the Portuguese, but 
they joined forces when they learned that the ships were headed to the Maldives, as the 
Portuguese were looking for a foothold in the Maldives.74 As a reward for their help, 
Sultan Kalu Mohamed allowed the Portuguese to build a depot in Male’ and agreed to 
pay tribute to Ali Rajaa. When the Maldives stopped paying tribute to Malabar kingdom 
in the mid-seventeenth century, they attempted to recapture Male’ on several occasions. 
In this struggle Malabar kings captured various parts of the Maldives, but each time was 
repulsed from everywhere except Maliku, the Maldives’ northernmost atoll.75   
This harassment continued until the British captured the Malabar region in the late 
eighteenth century. When the British captured the region in 1792, the Maliku was under 
the Malabar kingdom, so it became part of British India and the Maldives lost the atoll 
permanently.76 
B. THE PORTUGUESE THREAT 
The Maldives had trouble with the European colonial powers starting in the early 
sixteenth century. The first major European colonial power to show interest was Portugal, 
which eyed the trade route between the Indian subcontinent and the Arabian Peninsula. 
The Maldives was a mid-voyage resting harbor for ships and provided critical supplies 
such as coir ropes, blankets, and dried fish. Maldives workers were very advanced in 
wooden ship building and provided repair services to ships in port. The Maldives also 
traded valuable commodities like cowry shells, ambergris, and turtle shells.77 
With permission from Sultan Kalu Muhamad, the Portuguese started operating a 
depot in the Maldives in 1517.78 Once they had a foothold, they started robbing the 
                                                 
73 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 116. 
74 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 122. 
75 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 116. 
76 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 116–117, 126. 
77 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 154. 
78 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 122. 
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islanders and looting the docks without paying dues. This angered the locals, who burned 
down the Portuguese depot and killed all the Portuguese, ending the Portuguese trouble 
for a while. However, in 1552 when Sultan Hasan XI fled to Goa and converted to 
Christianity (changing his name to Don Manoel), he gave the Portuguese an opening by 
seeking their support.79 The Portuguese started sending expeditions to demand payments 
in the name of Don Manoel, the Christian Sultan of Maldives. The locals considered his 
conversion disgraceful, refused to pay tribute, and attacked the ships, capturing some and 
killing all aboard. Eventually the Portuguese arranged a large expedition and conquered 
Male’, killing the sultan Ali X. Portugal ruled brutally for 15 years. It looted the country 
and forced the locals to convert to Christianity. Finally, a local hero named Mohamed 
Thakurufaanu and his associates defeated them in 1573 after a prolonged seaborne 
guerilla campaign.80 The Portuguese then sent several expeditions to recapture Male’. 
After fighting for three years, a treaty was signed specifying that the Portuguese would 
leave the Maldives and the Maldivians in exchange would pay a pension to the Christian 
king and use Portuguese passports for travel.81 The Portuguese tried again to capture the 
Maldives in the early seventeenth century, but all attempts were defeated.82  
C. THE STRUCTURE OF THE EARLY MILITARY 
Given continuous threats to its sovereignty, the Maldives maintained a relatively 
strong military from the fifteenth century up until the mid-nineteenth century. The 
military had both a land and a naval component. The naval component consisted of 
locally built wooden ships fitted with cannons. The land component was divided into 
three regiments specialized in different fighting skills—a gunners regiment, a martial arts 
regiment and a sword regiment (Figure 4).83 
During this era, the primary mission of defending the country meant protecting 
the capital from falling into the hands of invaders. The Maldives, as a small island nation 
                                                 
79 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 123. 
80Theodore L Stoddard, Area Handbook for the Indian Ocean Territories  (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1971), 259. 
81 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 124. 
82 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 126. 
83 Rahmaan, Maldives Military History 1 [in Dhivehi],  5–8. 
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with limited resources, used its geography, and especially the treacherous network of 
atolls and reefs, to hide and launch surprise attacks on invading ships. Most famously, 
Mohamed Thakurufaanu used the maritime terrain to his advantage when he liberated the 
Maldives from the Portuguese. He hid his ship in natural harbors during the day and 
landed at night on islands where the Portuguese had detachments, attacking and escaping 
in the darkness. He used his superior navigation skills to escape pursuing ships in the 
networks of reefs.84 
 
Figure 4. The early military structure and command relationship (Rahmaan, 2010) 
Early defenses centered on protecting the capital. Successive sultans built an 
elaborate defensive structure in Male’. Even after the Portuguese were defeated, they and 
                                                 
84 Most famously, Mohamed Thakurufaanu used Maldivian geography to his advantage when his ship 
Kaluohfummi, with the Portuguese fleet in pursuit, simply sailed right through the middle of the island of 
Komandoo. When the Portuguese arrived, the island was whole and they had to sail around it. By the time 
they navigated the vast swath of reef attached to the island, the Kaluohfummi had disappeared. Later 
researchers discovered that Komandoo is actually two islands separated by a very narrow but navigable 




the Malabar continued attempts to overrun the Maldives in the 16th and 17th centuries. 
The military built a fort system around Male’ so they could attack ships entering and 
within the harbor (Male’ harbor at the time was a natural enclave encircled by reefs that 
offered protection from high seas). The defense of Male’ reached its high point in the 
1620s, when Sultan Mukarram Muhammed Imad-ul-deen  surrounded Male’ with a 20-
foot high fortified wall, with gun forts and bastions, parts of which survived into the 
1900s.85 
D. THE BRITISH THREAT 
The Maldives faced no major threats after defeating the Portuguese. Concerned 
about frequent shipwrecks, the British started surveying the Maldives in the early 1800s. 
At first, they simply determined navigation routes and drew charts. However, as the 
Maldives was strategically located in the eastern trade route, the British wanted to insure 
that no other power gained control of the territories. They forced the sultan to 
acknowledge the British suzerainty on 18 December 1887.86 
Under the agreement, the Maldives gave up foreign affairs to the British and in 
return the British protected the Maldives against foreign aggression, leaving domestic 
affairs to the sultan.87 With charts of the reefs allowing them to navigate through the 
islands, the British viewed the Maldives as a strategic backup location if the Japanese 
threatened British India and Sri Lanka.88 They established temporary air strips on the 
north and south islands of Kelaa and Gan, and later developed Gan as one of the strongest 
Royal Air Force bases in the Indian Ocean. Although the British relinquished their 
authority in 1965, they kept Gan Air Force Base operational until 1976.89 
For the most part, the British did not interfere with internal affairs. However, the 
1887 agreement had a significant impact on the Maldives’ military. By the mid-1800s, 
the British had defeated the Dutch and consolidated their power in the Indian Ocean. The 
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Maldives had no real or perceived enemies and gradually lost its appetite to support a 
military. The protective wall around Male’ and the gun forts became irrelevant and 
eventually were destroyed. The institutions dwindled and the military became a nominal 
force. Prior to the agreement with British, the Maldives had citizen-soldiers rather than a 
professional military organization. Early soldiers were paid mostly by sustenance, like 
rice; some senior appointments were rewarded with islands.90  
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the military was its most 
formidable, and yet it stayed out of politics. Various factors help explain this. Under the 
monarch, the military existed at the behest of the ruler, and going against him, 
irrespective of how he came to power, would result in negative outcomes to the military. 
Additionally, the military was well taken care of by whoever was in power. At during this 
time, the military as an institution was extremely busy defending the country from 
external threats and therefore did not have time or motivation to engage in domestic 
politics.  
E. DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY AS A PROFESSION 
After a period of diminished importance and interest in the military among the 
ruling élite, the county began to re-develop its military when Sultan Ibrahim Nur-ul-deen 
observed a group of youth marching together in drills. He liked the activity, and created a 
permanent drill team in 1892.91 Initially eight individuals were selected, and they served 
as escorts for the sultan as he visited in Male’. The organization was slow to develop, and 
sixty years later had fewer than 50 soldiers.92 In the absence of an outside threat, the 
organization developed as a ceremonial military with mostly ceremonial and policing 
duties. When the Maldives faced intense political upheaval following the first written 
constitution in 1934 and during the establishment and collapse of the first republic in 
1953, the military had no real clout and was only a spectator to the coups and counter 
coups.  
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The first real military challenge in the twentieth century came when the three 
most southern atolls (Huvadhoo, Fuvanhmulah, and Adhoo) started a secessionist 
movement between 1959 and 1964 led by an individual named Abdulla Afeef. The 
movement wanted to establish a separate state named United Suvadive Republic.93 It was 
widely believed that Afeef had the implicit backing of the British, who were at Gan 
running the Royal Air Force Base. Fearing British involvement, Prime Minister Ibrahim 
Nasir sent emissaries to negotiate with the secessionists.94 Once it was clear that Afeef 
and his supporters were in no mood to listen, Prime Minister Ibrahim Nasir decided to 
use the military to bring them under control, and the uprising was brutally crushed.   
Nasir led a contingent of soldiers on a merchant vessel to the island of Thinadhoo on 4 
February 1962, arrested Afeef’s supporters and ordered the inhabitants to leave the island 
by night fall of the next day.95 This marked the first military use of lethal force since 
early 1900s. The island was declared an “uninhabited island” and torched, destroying 
houses and vessels, in one of the most brutal and controversial chapters in modern 
Maldivian history. Threatened with the same treatment, Addo and Fuvahmulah gave up 
the idea of a separate republic.96 
By this time the constitution gave all executive powers to the prime minister and 
the sultan was just a figurehead. The secessionist movement was viewed as a political 
rather than a military threat. The incident did not initiate change or development to the 
military, which continued to perform ceremonial duties and law enforcement. 
The second major military challenge came when a Sri Lankan based terrorist 
group, the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Elaam (PLOTE)  attempted to 
capture Male’ with the aid of a few locals with an early morning surprise attack on 3  
November 1988. The Maldives had a different president, Maumoon Abdul Qayoom, 
                                                 
93 The secessionist movement was formed to protest against the measures the government initiated to 
centralize power. When government ordered all the ships travelling to and from the Maldives to come to 
Male’ for customs clearance and to pay custom duties, there were protests from people in the three 
southernmost atolls who traditionally travelled directly to Sri Lanka and India. The policy made their 
journey longer and became a burden. This led to the formation of a People’s Council representing the three 
atolls; Afeef became the president of the United Suvadive Republic. 
94 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 204. 
95 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 205. 
96 Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, 205. 
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elected in 1978. After assuming power he instituted limited changes in the military, such 
as restructuring the Ministry of Defence and enlisting more educated youth into the 
services. However, the ceremonial and law enforcement mission of the military continued 
as its main focus. The terrorists attempted to capture MNDF Headquarters, the nation’s 
only security installation at the time. If captured, the country would fall. After a gunfight 
lasting 18 hours, when they were unable to capture the installation, the terrorists and their 
coconspirators took two dozen civilian hostages and hijacked a merchant ship anchored 
off Male’ and fled. They were captured on the high seas with the help of the Indian 
military.97 
The terrorist attack was a wakeup call that Maldives had security challenges. The 
government, with British help, began training soldiers in infantry and war fighting, 
opened an infantry training school in Girifushi, and through defense cooperation 
initiatives started sending officers and soldiers for training in other countries.98  
Military personnel, equipment and capabilities grew exponentially since 1988. 
However, there was no legislative development to commensurate with the institutional 
development of the military. No legislation governed the military—it operated under an 
executive order by the president. The executive order was derived from the authority in 
Act no 1/68 (official business) which empowered the president to create ministries.99 
Under this order, national defense was assigned to the Ministry of Defence and National 
Security, and the MNDF was tasked as the implementing agency of the MoDNS. This 
legal state of affairs continued until the People’s Majlis enacted the Armed Force Act of 
2008.  
From a CMR perspective, the relationship between the executive and the military 
remained stable since military began developing as a profession. The military served 
under the sultan in the era of consultative monarchy, under the prime minister in the 
constitutional monarchy, and under the president in the republic. Until the 2008 
constitution, national political power was largely in the hands of the executive, and all the 
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CMR institutions reported only to the chief executive. Thus, the executive had 
unchallenged institutional and legislative power over the military. This history of 
executive power over the military institutionalized a single stakeholder mentality within 
the military and in the executive branch.  
In summary, history shows that the military in the Maldives went from a 
formidable, highly professional, outward-oriented fighting force to an internally focused 
law enforcement agency. Since 1988, the country has been trying to reestablish a 
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IV.  STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESS OF CIVIL-MILITARY 
INSTITUTIONS  
Having established the antecedent political and military history of the Maldives, it 
is important to examine how the nation’s political and military history affected the 
formation of the democratic civilian control of the military. This chapter focuses on 
democratic civilian control variables: institutional controls, oversight, and professional 
norms. 
A. INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS 
Institutional control in the CMR literature is defined as the capacity of civilian 
institutions and their officials to develop and implement defense and security policy in 
conjunction with the military.100 Institutional control requires a state bureaucracy that has 
legislative mandates, adequate resources (including funding and knowledgeable staff) and 
leaders willing to exercise their authority for institutional control. It also requires military 
obedience to direction and guidance from the legally designated institutions in the 
executive or legislative branch.101  
1. The Ministry of Defence and National Security 
Until the 2008 constitution, direction of the Maldives military was solely by order 
of the executive, with no say from the legislative branch. As discussed in Chapters II and 
III, this is rooted in the history of the executive-military relationship throughout the 
history of the country. The executive held virtually unchallenged political power and 
there was no mechanism for the legislature to play an effective role in defense policy 
making.  
A separate ministry to oversee the function of the armed forces came into 
existence only in 1932, under the country’s first written constitution, when Sultan 
Shamsu-ul-din appointed his cabinet. Since the military at the time was very much 
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domestically focused, the first ministry of defense was called Mahkamathul Aman Ammu 
(Office of Public Safety), a name that continued through the dissolution of the monarchy, 
the establishment of the first republic, the return to monarchy, and the establishment of 
the second republic in 1968. The first president of the second republic, Ibrahim Nasir, 
kept the focus of the military as a domestic security force. He coupled the military with 
the country’s only police force, which was functioning as an independent institution, on 
13 March 1972, changing the name to the Ministry of Public Safety. This further 
consolidated the domestic focus as well as the power of the security institution under 
him.102  
Following the change of government in 1978, President Maumoon Abdul 
Qayoom kept the institutional structure and focus largely intact. However, when 
supporters of the previous president hired a group of ex-British SAS mercenaries and 
attempted a coup in 1980, Qayoom saw the need for the military to move beyond 
domestic law enforcement.103 Hence, he started developing the police and the military as 
separate units within the larger umbrella of the National Security Service (NSS). To 
represent this change, he changed the Ministry of Public Safety to its current name, the 
Ministry of Defense and National Security.104  
Under Qayoom, the MoDNS underwent major changes. In 1992, the Department 
of Immigration and Emigration became part of the MoDNS. In 2004 the police function 
was separated and placed under the Ministry of Home Affairs, with a mandate to develop 
the police as a civil force. Likewise, following the Asian tsunami in December 2004, a 
National Disaster Management Center was created under the ministry. (After an initial 
response phase, this became an independent institution in 2008, and was reattached back 
 
                                                 
102 Jaufar Abdul Rahmaan, “History of the Ministry of Defence [in Dhivehi],” MNDF Magazine, 
http://magazine.diteonline.net/2011/08/28/From-the-records/MOD/index.html, accessed August, 04, 2012. 
103 The plot was led by a brother-in-law of President Nasir. The ex-SAS mercenaries came to 
Maldives as tourists with weapons smuggled inside scuba equipment. Although they had a perfect chance 
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told prior to their arrival.    
104 Rahmaan,”History of the Ministry of Defence [in Dhivehi].” 
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to MoDNS in 2012). The department of Immigration and Emigration was divested when 
the Immigration act of 2007 was passed by the People’s Majlis, making it an independent 
institution.  
From a CMR perspective, it is important to highlight that the changes to MoDNS 
prior to the 2008 constitution were done by the executive with no role for the legislature. 
There was no distributive authority over defense policy making required for a democratic 
institutional control régime. As all changes were made through executive orders, the 
military lacked a strong legislative foundation to establish its permanency. The executive 
could change the structure and the mandate of the security force at will and without 
scrutiny.  
Nevertheless, apart from the lack of distributive authority and scrutiny, the 
MoDNS had tight control over the military. This was accomplished mostly through 
budgetary control and direct involvement of the executive. The ministry with authority 
over the administration of the budget could fund or defund initiatives by the military at 
will. Additionally, except for Ibrahim Nasir, other presidents (President Ameen and 
President Qayoom) for most part kept the portfolio of the Minister of Defense for 
themselves, ensuring personal control.105 
Even though the MoDNS kept a strong hand in terms of control, the ministry 
lacked professional civilian staff trained in security and defense. Consequently, even now 
the MoDNS relies on the military to generate defense policy. This allows the military to 
monopolize the defense policy process, making it difficult for the MoDNS to really 
scrutinize the motives of the military. Overall, the MoDNS is a mixed bag when it comes 
to the features required to exercise effective institutional control. However, as the 
ministry is the oldest institution of control in Maldives, it has the most influence over the 
military.  
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2. National Security Council and National Security Advisor 
The National Security Council (NSC) is a new phenomenon in Maldives. It only 
came into being following the passage of the Armed Force Act of 2008—the first-ever 
legislation enacted to govern the military—as part of the reform initiative begun in 2004. 
According to Clause 13(a) of the act, there should be a National Security Council to 
advise the president on matters of national security. The NSC is made up of the President, 
the Vice President, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister 
of Home Affairs, the Attorney General, and the Chief of Defense Force, along with 
anyone deemed by the president important enough to participate on a temporary basis.106 
The absence of an NSC-type arrangement prior to the 2008 legislation can be attributed 
to the fact that the military mostly operated in a personal relationship between the 
president and the military hierarchy. Qayoom stayed in power for 30 years and the 
military top brass remained fairly constant. Their mutual longevity fostered a 
personalized and clientistic relationship that made the executive comfortable with the 
counsel and advice provided by the military leaders.  
The formation of NSC by legislative mandate is one of the most important 
challenges to the military monopoly on defense policymaking. In addition, the presence 
of all the crucial cabinet portfolios pertaining to security and foreign policy is a positive 
environment for developing a holistic security policy for the Maldives. While there are 
numerous positives to NSC, one of the most crucial elements is missing:  a civilian 
National Security Advisor (NSA) or a secretariat to function as the brain of the NSC. 
Because the NSC consists mostly of cabinet ministers with their own portfolios to  worry 
about, an NSA is required to do the background work and generate policy alternatives. A 
further weakness in the legislation is that it does not mention the frequency of the 
meetings or require publication of any defense or security related information for scrutiny 
by the other branches and the general public. 
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To address this missing link, President Nasheed created a NSA office and 
appointed the first NSA on 10 December 2009 by executive order.107 This could have 
strengthened the NSC, but according to the press, the NSA mostly operates as an 
independent entity from the NSC. Since its creation, the NSA has become very active—
to the point that the press and opposition politicians question whether the NSA is taking 
over the function of the NSC and pushing security policy in various national security 
issues.108 For example, between December 2010 and May 2011, the NSA office 
advocated policies relating to soldiers on peacekeeping missions, establishing a national 
security framework, and dealing with the growing number of expatriate workers in the 
Maldives. What became problematic at the time was that, according to the press, the main 
issues discussed in the cabinet were based on the policy papers submitted by the NSA 
office.109 As these issues were highly controversial, it would have been better if these 
issues came to the cabinet as proposals from the NSC rather than NSA—after all, the 
NSC is the legislatively mandated authority to generate policy for the president.  
The office of NSA was short-lived, as it was created by an executive order. The 
office continued to exist, but since the new president came to power on 7 February 2012, 
the position has remained vacant. The supposed brain function of the NSC is missing as 
there is no legislative mandate requiring an NSA. It is important to note that, because 
political appointees change frequently in a democracy, there is a huge requirement for 
permanent professional staff in the secretariat of NSC and NSA to provide history, 
context, continuity, and professional advice for political leaders who may lack security-
related savvy when they assume office. 
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3. The Parliament and Parliamentary Committees 
Although Maldivian legislative history dates to 1932 and the first constitution, it 
is only since 2008 that the constitution provides for an independent legislative body. The 
initial legislative bodies were appointed by the sultan. When Maldives started electing 
legislatures by popular vote, legislators were permitted to hold dual jobs. Most cabinet 
ministers and senior government officials, with the advantage of office and their political 
capital, ran for the legislature and got elected. There was little separation of powers 
between the executive and the legislature.  
Prior to the 2008 constitution, there were no permanent committees in the 
parliament. The People’s Majlis had functioned simply as a lawmaking body, with 
virtually no oversight power. The Maldives has a unicameral parliament with 77 
members. Legislators are elected by popular vote on the basis of 2 members for first 
5,000 residents registered for each administrative district and an additional member for 
each additional 5,000 registered residents. All members are elected through a 
proportional representation system.110 The constitution bars members of the People’s 
Majlis from holding any other public office.  
The 2008 constitution gives considerable power to the elected representatives in 
influencing defense policy and structure. The constitution gives a clear mandate for the 
parliament to enact legislation that governs the structure and the principles by which all 
the security services should operate. According to Article 239(a) of the constitution, “the 
People’s Majlis shall enact a statute on organization of and the principles pursuant to with 
each security services shall operate.”111 Additionally, under the current rules, legislation 
and amendments can be initiated by an individual member, by a committee or by the 
government through member representing the political party in power.112 This is a stark 
difference from the previous practice in which only the government could initiate the 
process of amending and proposing new legislation. 
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Additionally, the Majlis has two separate committees with power to shape the 
security forces. The constitution in Article 241 calls for a permanent committee in the 
parliament to manage the affairs of the security services. This is the only committee 
mandated by the constitution—all others were created by the Majlis itself. The 
constitution established the Security Services Committee (Salaamathee 
Khidumathakaabehey Committee), known as the 241 Committee. It has the privilege of 
being the principal agent in the matter of enacting legislation regarding security services. 
The current Armed Force Act was passed by People’s Majlis prior to the constitution of 
2008 and is yet to be synchronized with the new system. When the People’s Majlis take 
up this legislation, they will have power to shape defense policy and institutions by 
legislative action. (For now, individual lawmakers and committees are able to propose 
new legislation and amendments.) In addition, the Finance Committee (Maaliyath 
Committee), which has the power to review and amend the annual budget submitted by 
the government, has the power to shape security policy through appropriations—the 
“power of purse.”113 
Since 2008, the People’s Majlis have shown a willingness to confront the 
executive and the security establishment when they feel left out of major security and 
defense related decision making. For example, when an effort by the government to bring 
two Palestinian detainees from the Guantanamo Bay Prison to the Maldives for 
rehabilitation was leaked in the press in early 2010, the security related committees in the 
Majlis got involved. They conducted hearings and ultimately got a resolution passed by 
the full floor forbidding the executive from executing the plan to rehabilitate detainees in 
the country. They argued that doing so would bring unnecessary risk of terrorism and is 
not in the best interest of Maldives.114  
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Although the People’s Majlis has the legislative mandate, a willingness to 
exercise power, and the power of purse, these strengths are overshadowed by the fact that 
the legislative body is starved for security related knowledge (in the current Majlis there 
is only one legislature who is retired military). Additionally, the legislative body does not 
have an independent research institution to provide objective and independent analyses of 
issues. This lack of security knowledge within the legislative body is further exacerbated 
by the fact that the committees of the Majlis also lack professional staffers to advise 
committee members. However, notwithstanding the knowledge gap, the People’s Majlis 
appears to have adequate institutional control over the armed forces.  
B. OVERSIGHT 
Oversight is identified as actions by state institutions, as well as non-state actors, 
to make sure the security forces operate within the mandate provided to them by the 
elected political leaders. For effective oversight, the institutions should have legislative 
authority, the capacity and a willingness to exercise oversight, and a willingness to play 
by the rules among all concerned parties. The formal oversight of the military is 
exercised by agencies of the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Also, in a 
democratic CMR régime, oversight is exercised by civic organizations, a free press and 
research institutes.115 
1. Executive Oversight 
During the time of sultans, the military reported directly to the executive, so the 
sultan directly controlled all military affairs. It was a similar situation in the republic as 
well. For example, President Qayoom held the portfolio of Minister of Defense from 
1978 until 2003. This arrangement allowed the executive to keep a close, personalized 
watch over the military. Today, the MoDNS controls the budget to the MNDF, allowing 
it to see how the allocated funds are used. Furthermore, the MoDNS functions as the 
liaison between the MNDF and all other government institutions, giving it control over 
                                                 




all the communication. Therefore, it can be said that there is tight executive oversight 
over the monetary and administrative aspects of the military. 
2. Parliamentary Oversight 
Parliamentary oversight is a completely new phenomenon, as the People’s Majlis 
gained this power only with enactment of the 2008 constitution. It is one of the most 
contentious areas of CMR in the Maldives. According to Article 99 of the constitution, 
“the People’s Majlis or any of its committees has the power to (a) summon any person to 
appear before to give evidence under oath, or to produce documents... .”116 With this 
authority, the parliament established a number of permanent committees with oversight 
power that extends to all state institutions, including the power to subpoena institutions, 
individuals and documents.117 At present, there are nine permanent government oversight 
committees of which three have oversight over the armed forces. From a CMR 
perspective, this is an extremely positive development, as all these committee have a 
legal mandate for oversight. The three relevant oversight committees are the Security 
Services Committee, the Finance Committee, and the National Security Committee. 
The Security Services Committee (Salaamathee Khidumathakaabehey 
Committee) is the primary oversight committee on all matters relating to the functionality 
of the Maldives National Defense Force and the Maldives Police. Its responsibilities 
include conducting hearings on the various actions of the MNDF and the police. It is also 
the principal committee for legislation related to security services.118 
The Finance Committee (Maaliyath Committee) has oversight of matters relating 
to all financial transactions of the state. Its responsibilities include conducting hearings 
on the annual budget when the government submits it, monitoring whether the money is 
spent according to the budget passed by the parliament, and following up on reports by 
the Auditor General about financial dealings of state institutions.119 
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The National Security Committee (Gaumee Salaamathaabehey Committee) has 
oversight of any matter relevant to national security. Its responsibilities include 
conducting hearings on national security issues and monitoring legislation that may affect 
national security. This committee has oversight over the Ministry of Defense and 
National Security, not over the MNDF itself.120 
These committees have considerable power to question and demand answers from 
the security services. For instance, according to statistics from the People’s Majlis, the 
Security Services Committee conducted about 70 hearings on the military and the police 
between its inception in May 2009 and July 2012.121  
Even though the committees are active and there is an elaborate oversight 
mechanism backed by law, the short history of legislative oversight in the Maldives has 
been contentious. The controversy began when the Chief of Defense Force (CDF), the 
highest-ranking military officer, refused to testify for the Security Services Committee. 
According to the committee, in July 2012 it twice requested that the CDF appear to 
clarify the actions of the MNDF following the mass cabinet resignation in late June 
2010.122  The CDF excused himself, and the committee issued a subpoena. The CDF 
again refused to appear, arguing that the minister is the responsible authority who should 
answer to the parliament.123 When the committee failed to persuade the CDF to appear, 
the issue was sent to the full sitting, and the Majlis voted to seek an advisory opinion 
from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion that the 
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Security Services Committee does have the power to ask the CDF to answer questions, 
thus settling the question of oversight authority once and for all.124  
The downside to the current arrangement is this. Given that the Maldives does not 
have large military, multiple committees could diffuse the focus of the oversight function. 
Also, even though the committee is legislatively powerful, as discussed in the section on 
institutional control, the committees lack security related knowledge due to the absence 
of professional staffers and an independent legislative research institute. Consequently, 
the parliamentary oversight function is also hindered by the knowledge gap. 
3. Judicial Oversight 
Judicial oversight is also a new phenomenon in the Maldives. Prior to the 2008 
constitution, the highest authority for judicial review was the president. With the creation 
of an independent judiciary for the first time, the Supreme Court especially has played a 
very active role. Although the judiciary is independent, the country is faced with a 
shortage of qualified judges to fill positions on the court. Hence, incompetency prevails, 
especially on the lower courts. In addition to the general weaknesses resulting from 
personnel problems, the Maldives has a problem with implementing judicial decisions, 
especially when they are security related or against the government. Particularly between 
2008 and 2011, there were numerous instances when the military simply disobeyed court 
orders and rulings, including rulings by the Supreme Court. Here are some examples.  
The Interim Supreme Court that came to existence with the ratification of the 
2008 constitution expired on 7 August 2010. When the parliament failed to appoint 
permanent judges to the court, the military locked the court on order of the government, 
preventing the judges and administrative staff from entering the building. The 
government argued that with the expiration of the interim deadline, the employment of 
the justices was no longer valid. This incident resulted in Attorney General Husnu Suood 
resigning and the Prosecutor General Ahmed Muizz pressing charges against the state 
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seeking a temporary warrant for the release of the Supreme Court building keys.125 On 9 
August 2010, the Civil Court decided that the Interim Supreme Court should continue to 
exist until the parliament appointed permanent judges. The Court ordered the military to 
release the keys. However, the next day the military barred the justices from the building, 
allowed only the administrative staff to enter.126 This dispute continued until the 
parliament appointed permanent justices the next day.127  
Another incident began on 15 July 2010, when the military detained Abdullah 
Yameen, an MP and President of the People’s Alliance political party, in a military 
facility for nine days. When Yameen’s lawyers filed a petition in the court claiming 
violations of fundamental rights and calling for his immediate release, the military 
rejected several orders to appear in court for hearings and refused to release him, 
claiming he was being held for national security reasons.128 During his detention, the 
speaker of the parliament asked the MNDF to arrange for Yameen to participate in the 
sittings of the Parliament, a privilege granted to parliamentarians by parliamentary 
regulation, but the MNDF did not make the arrangements. As the political situation 
deteriorated, the United States Embassy got involved, and the U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Robert Blake, asked the government to either 
bring charges against Yameen or release him.129 Yameen was released on 24 July 2010 
and no charges were pressed.130  
In another incident, the military arrested Abdulla Mohamed, a criminal court 
judge, on 16 January 2012 and detained him in a military facility citing a national 
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security threat. The High Court issued multiple orders for the MNDF to appear in the 
court, which the military rejected.131 Subsequently, the High Court heard the case in 
absentia, and declared that the military has no legal basis for the arrest and detention of 
any individual, that issues relating to judges must be addressed by the People’s Majlis 
and the Judicial Service Commission, and that the judge should be immediately 
released.132 When the military failed to obey the ruling of High Court, the Supreme Court 
heard the case and also ordered the military to release the judge immediately; again the 
military ignored the court order.133 Abdulla Mohamed’s detention continued until the 
collapse of the government on 7 February 2012.   
These incidents illustrate that it is not enough to have legislative authority and 
courts willing to exercise their duties. Institutions at the receiving end also have to play 
by the rules and must adhere to the ideals and values of democracy. In the Maldives, 
although there is an independent judiciary by definition, judicial oversight did not 
function as it should. It is important to note that the military does not completely ignore 
all judicial decisions. Since the start of the democratic transition, a number of cases have 
been decided against the military and the military has complied with those decisions. The 
issues that became problematic involve a few cases in which the chief executive exerted 
influence as the commander in chief, and the military played along without thinking 
about the larger consequences. 
4. The Role of Civic Society (Media and NGOs) 
In the last eight years, Maldives has witnessed the rise of a strong civic society; 
citizens organize actively and protest against various government policies. Presently there 
are 1121 registered civil society organizations in the Maldives out of which 449 are based 
in Male’ and 672 are based on other islands.134 Among these there are 138 civic 
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organizations that direct promote democracy and human rights.135 In most instances, 
civic organizations have been the quickest and most effective in protesting against 
various actions of the military.  
The media in the Maldives also plays a crucial role in keeping the government 
and politicians in check. Prior to 2007, except for a few print and online newspapers, the 
media was government owned. When the government started licensing TV and radio for 
private broadcasters in 2007, a number of private/commercial TV and radio channels 
were created.136 The People’s Majlis enacted legislation to form an independent public 
TV and radio broadcaster managed by a board of directors appointed by the People’s 
Majlis. The increase in the number of TV and radio channels representing multiple 
political perspectives and the press freedom granted in the 2008 constitution have enabled 
the media outlets to play a commendable role in reporting news in a timely manner.  
The Maldives have a number of widely read and circulated daily Internet 
newspapers and weekly magazines and blogs. News about any institution, including the 
military, is disseminated spontaneously. However, as media freedom is a relatively new 
phenomenon, the media has not yet moved beyond reporting news into investigative 
journalism and the incorporation of analytical and policy perspectives in their reports. At 
present, the Maldives does not have any civilian research institutes or professional 
journals that publish on national security issues. Therefore, oversight by civil society is 
exercised only at the surface level. The long-term and policy aspects of the defense sector 
go virtually without scrutiny. 
C. PROFESSIONALISM 
In the CMR literature, professionalism is identified as the inherent and learned 
culture that exists within the military—it is apolitical, obeys the civilian authority, and 
truly functions as a servant of the nation. This ideal state of professionalism is achieved 
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by military leaders’ experience and prolonged specialized education.137 The idea of 
military professionalism as a larger category includes universal values such as war 
fighting capabilities and selfless service, but in the CMR realm, the idea of 
professionalism must be derived from the culture and context of the particular polity and 
society the military serves.138 When talking about military professionalism, the CMR 
literature mostly focuses on the officer corps.139 To understand the level of 
professionalism it is important to understand how the office corps is educated, trained and 
promoted through ranks, because officers are responsible as commanders to execute 
missions set by the political leaders. 
1. Training and Promotion of Officers 
Professional military training for officers is relatively a new endeavor for the 
Maldives. Before 1988, training was ad-hoc and focused on physical fitness and drill. 
Very few people went abroad for training. In a few instances, the military conducted 
training with instructors brought in from British Ceylon. In essence, the training system 
was dormant until the abortive terrorist attack by the PLOTE in November 1988. Soon 
after the attack, MNDF started building its military training. Since then, with the help of 
friendly countries, the MNDF has established various training schools. Currently, the 
training of MNDF is arranged under the Defense Institute for Training and Education 
(DITE) with five schools—the Marine Corps Training School, Coast Guard Training 
School, Special Forces Training School, Non-Commissioned Officer Academy, and 
Officer Training School. Even though there is an elaborate training structure within 
MNDF, most training is for Non-Commissioned Officers. The Officer Training School 
was inaugurated only in 2010 and is yet to establish itself.  
As there was no officer training system in the Maldives before 2010, MNDF 
depended completely on foreign countries for officer training, and still does to a large 
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extent. Officer training includes commissioning training and career advancement 
training. MNDF trains its officers in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Malaysia, 
Britain and United States. This system has advantages and disadvantages in developing a 
professional officer corps. Given the range of countries MNDF relies on for training, 
officers trained in different countries come away with very different experiences and 
knowledge. The countries offering training have different value systems and approaches 
toward civil-military relations, and there is no unified understanding of what it means to 
be a professional officer. Because of this diversity, and the lack of an established in-
country training institution to harness and synchronize the training offered by different 
countries, developing a professional officer corps suited to the Maldivian context is a 
daunting challenge for MNDF. 
Until 2008, the Maldives had a single ladder system of promotion in which 
soldiers rose through non-commissioned ranks to become commissioned officers. In late 
2008, MNDF established separate career paths for officers and non-commissioned 
officers. The MNDF has a published promotion manual detailing the criteria and training 
requirements for promotion to different ranks. The promotion of officers, including 
general officers, is the privilege of the Minister of Defense. The appointment of Chief of 
Defense Force and Vice Chief of Defense force falls under the president.140 Unlike in 
many countries, there is no requirement for confirmation of service chiefs or officers by 
the legislature. While in theory this may not have a direct influence on professionalism, 
because the hiring and firing function is the prerogative of the executive, it does raise the 
possibility that military loyalty may become unbalanced. The military could be inclined 
towards the executive in the event of a clash between the executive and legislative 
branch. The requirement for the military to be impartial and operate according to the 
constitution rather than the wishes of any branch of government is especially important in 
newer democracies, because in consolidating democracies there is often contentious 
struggle between the executive and legislature. This struggle is more evident in the 
aftermath of an authoritarian regime, because there is always suspicion that the executive 
is trying to go back to the old days when the executive had a free hand in the affairs of 
                                                 




state. Maldives press reports after each controversial use of the military by the executive 
show that editorial narratives, as well as speeches by party activists, focus on the theme 
that the executive wants to use the military to intimidate the opposition or establish a 
dictatorship.141 If military is further used for controversial purposes, like arresting 
individuals or disrupting judicial proceedings, the military will hurt its professionalism 
and do damage to its professional image.  
The strengths and weakness of the CMR institutions discussed in this chapter are 
summarized in Table 2. 
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 A long institutional history of functioning as a separate office 
 Minister of Defense has considerable powers under the Armed Force Act 
 MoDNS controls the budget of MNDF 
 
 No independent legislation governing the MOD (except for 
references to minister of defense in the Armed Force Act of 2008) 
 Largely depends on uniformed staff for policy alternatives 







 Armed Force Act of 2008 gives legal basis to function as an advisory 
body 
 Legislation is weak as there are no clear mandates and roles for NSC 
in the Armed Force Act 
 NSA lacks the brain function ( professional staff to do research and 




 None  There is no legislation governing NSA 
 NSA is not appointed regularly Weak 
Parliamentary 
Committees 
 Has the power to enact and amend laws relating to military 
 Parliament has the power to pass and amend the budgets 
 Clear constitutional mandate for parliamentary committees to influence 
defense policy 
 Once the budget is passed,  little control over  the administration of 
the budget 
 Parliament does not have professional staffers to aid legislators in 





 President is commander in chief 
 President appoints and dismisses the Chief of Defense Force and Vice 
Chief of Defense force at will 
 Promotion process is controlled by the executive (through Minister of 
Defense) 
 Executive has considerable control of the budget (via administration of 
budget through Ministry of Finance) 
 Civilian institutions in executive branch have limited trained, 




 A clear constitutional mandate for the parliament to oversee the military 
 Permanent parliamentary committees are tasked to execute oversight 
functions  
 Too many committees looking into different aspects of the military 
means there is no comprehensive oversight 
 Conflicting legislation as to the exercise of oversight  
 No role in appointing and dismissing service chiefs 
 No role in officer promotion process   
 Committees does not have professional staffers 
Moderate 
Judicial Oversight  Constitution guarantees an independent judiciary 
 The country has a three tier court system 
 Inadequate enforcement capability across the state 
 Severe shortage of qualified judges  





 Spontaneous reporting of news 
 Views of different sides represented 
 Active civic groups and associations 
 Reporting does not go beyond news  
 No professional civil institute  researching security and defense 






 Institutionalized mechanism for recruitment and training 
 MNDF formed a separate school for officer training  in 2010 (a work in 
progress)  
 Officers trained mostly abroad; CMR and other value systems may 
be contrary to democratic CMR 
 Not enough in-country training institutions for officers 
Weak 
Promotion  Established and published procedures for promotion 
 In house promotion boards to scrutinize candidates for promotion 
 Promotion system solely controlled by the executive branch 
 No outside mechanism to ensure promotions given in accordance 
with guidelines 
Moderate 
Table 2.   Strengths and weakness of existing CMR institutions 
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V.  SYSTEMIC CHALLENGES IN ESTABLISHING A 
DEMOCRATIC CMR REGIME 
Having seen how the individual CMR variables developed over time and where 
they stand now, it is important to discuss the systemic challenges in the formation of the 
CMR and in moving forward. From Table 2 in the previous chapter, it is evident that 
there are many areas that need improvement. For instance, the executive has a much 
greater power over military than the legislature in terms of control and oversight. In a 
presidential system this is not necessarily a problem, but in the case of Maldives, it is 
evident that the executive has misused the military.  
The use of the military for various questionable tasks in the name of national 
security, and judicial determination that such use is illegal or unconstitutional, has huge 
ramifications, not only for CMR, but for democratization overall. In the democratization 
literature it is well established that in the consolidation process, the military should be 
used judiciously for controversial tasks that may be viewed as political.142 According to 
researchers, when the military is used to consolidate power and institutionalize 
democratic change, a number of democratic deficits occur. First, this allows the military 
to leverage undue influence by becoming the savior of the executive. Second, 
democratization is a process that needs to be managed, and using the military for political 
purpose short-circuits the democratization process. The most dangerous and lasting 
damage, according to researchers, is that once the military is involved in the political 
process, it becomes very difficult to disengage.143 Once the process begins, successive 
governments use the military to stay in power, since relying on the military is easier and 
more convenient than developing lasting democratic institutions.144  This leads to a 
vicious cycle of unhealthy CMR based on quid pro quo. In addition, when the military is 
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used for political activities, it takes away the opportunity for other vital democratic 
institutions to perform their duties and grow within the system.145  
A number of examples of the dangers of using military during democratic 
consolidation are found in the literature. Among the clearest in South Asia are the cases 
of India and Pakistan. Both countries got their independence from the British at the same 
time. India consciously decided that it was not going to allow use of the military in the 
democratic consolidation process even though it faced many challenges with the 
consolidation. Hence, India did not have any coups or attempted coups, and the country 
was able to develop a democracy and a professional military.146 On the other hand, 
Pakistan decided to let the military play a decisive role in the political process. After 
more than 60 years of independence, the military is enshrined in the political process, the 
country is plagued with coups, and Pakistan has been under military rule for almost half 
of its independent history.147 As a result of military involvement, Pakistan is still unable 
to develop durable democratic institutions and a democratic CMR.148 For the Maldives 
there is an important lesson to learn from these examples. In the last three years, the 
country has witnessed controversial uses of the military in the political process. If the 
political leaders keep solving political problems by using the military, there is a real 
danger that the military and the polity will establish a clientelistic relationship, with the 
military taking prerogatives that are inconsistent with democratic CMR. Moving forward, 
the country needs to break free from the past and refrain from substituting military action 
for political solutions.  
In any consolidating democracy, and especially in a presidential system where the 
onus of meeting public expectations rest on the shoulders of the executive, there is 
always temptation to use whatever means necessary to deliver results. This temptation 
becomes stronger if there are contentious relationships among the institutions of 
government. However, in a democracy there is solemn duty for all the institutions to 
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resist temptation and play by the rules even in times of inconvenience. In the case of the 
Maldives, soon after it began the consolidation process there were contentious and at 
times obstructionist politics, especially between the executive and the legislature. This 
chaotic consolidation process can be traced to a combination of factors that arose from a 
lack of legislative clarity and the inability of legislators to enact crucial laws in a timely 
manner.  
A. CONTINUING LEGACY OF THE PAST: THE SINGLE STAKEHOLDER 
MENTALITY 
There is an underlying and more subtle challenge in the organizational history and 
institutional memory of the MNDF. The Maldives has a roller coaster constitutional 
history with seven separate constitutions since 1933. The first clear provision for an 
armed force appeared only in the 2008 constitution. This means that the Maldives 
military have been under complete control by the executive for more than a century. 
Hence, it is safe to assume that the institution has enshrined a single stakeholder 
mentality in its organizational history. Additionally, as the military remained relatively 
dormant until it started developing as a professional organization in the late 1980s, the 
political system in which it developed—an autocratic system with an extremely powerful 
executive—has shaped the organizational memory. Under the constitutions of 1968 and 
1997, the president is both chief executive and the highest authority for judicial review. 
These two constitutions further gave the president the power to appoint members of 
parliament (under the 1968 constitution, 8 appointed and 46 elected; under the 1997 
constitution, 8 appointed and 44 elected).149 Most cabinet members and senior 
government official were also elected to the parliament, further muddying the legislature 
with the executive power.  
Unchallenged executive power has had an unquestionable impact on the 
institutional memory and the operating philosophy of the military. For instance, until 
2008, the oath of office for soldiers read, “I swear in the name of Allah … to be steadfast 
in defending the county with honor and integrity and protect the leaders (verin) from 
                                                 
149 The People’s Special Majlis, Constitution of Maldives [in Dhivehi]  (Maldives Gazette 1997); 
Constitutional Assembly, Constitution of Maldives [in Dhivehi]  (Maldives Gazette 1968), 18. 
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enemies and traitors.” In this oath of office there is a heavy emphasis on protecting the 
leaders rather than the constitution. As an oath of office is derived from basic principles 
of an organization and its mission, the idea of protecting the verin became a long term 
element of indoctrination internalized by the organization and its people. In the Armed 
Force Act of 2008, the oath of office was modified to read, “I swear in the name of Allah 
… to be steadfast in defending the constitution, religion of Islam and the Maldivian State 
with honor and integrity.” This marks a positive development in the philosophy of the 
military in a democratic society—defending the constitution and the state rather than 
elected officials or government.  
However, the military has much to do to demystify the past and embrace the new 
ideal of a military that serves the state rather than the executive. For example, the MNDF 
Code of Ethics—one of the most basic statements of military principles still in use—
states three basic commitments: to be faithful to the beliefs of Islam, to give selfless 
service to the nation, and to obey and assist the duly elected government.150 The idea of 
obeying and protecting the government is not consistent with the democratic system, 
because in a democratic society the government is just one component of the state. 
Hence, the ideology of the military should be adjusted to give allegiance to the 
constitution rather than to individual components of the state.  
B. LACK OF LEGISLATIVE CLARITY 
As in most consolidating democracies, the Maldives needs legislation that clearly 
defines the privileges and boundaries of state institutions, including the actors in the 
realm of CMR. For instance, in the example highlighted in the discussion of 
parliamentary oversight, the refusal of the CDF to appear before the Security Service 
Committee was based on clauses 10 (e) and 11(e) of the Armed Force Act, where it states 
that the CDF is answerable to the minister and the minister is to be answerable to the 
President and the People’s Majlis.151 According to this article there is room to interpret 
                                                 
150 MNDF, Code of Ethics [in Dhivehi]  (Male’: MNDF Media and Publishing Service, 2002), 1–15. 
151 The Armed Force Act of 2008 [in Dhivehi], Law no. 1/2008, (Maldives Gazette, 2008), Clause 10, 
11. 
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that the CDF does not have to answer to the parliament. However, Article 239 (b) of the 
constitution says, “The security services shall be subjected to the authority of the 
People’s Majlis.” Furthermore, Article 241 of the constitution says, “A committee of the 
People’s Majlis shall be established to exercise continuing oversight of the operations of 
the security services…”152 Additionally, Article 99 of the constitution says, “The 
People’s Majlis or any of its committees has the power to: (a) summon any person to 
appear before it to give evidence under oath or produce documents…”153  
In this case, with clear constitutional authority for subpoena of individuals and the 
subsequent Supreme Court advisory opinion, the matter was resolved. However, there are 
more contentious and pressing issues that are not legislatively clear. In padlocking the 
Supreme Court, the arrest of Yameen and the case of the Superior Court judge, the 
government argued that these actions were taken by the military for national security 
reasons. The government claimed that the Constitution and the Armed Force Act gives 
the president power to employ the military in matters deemed necessary for national 
security. Even though in all three cases the courts decided that the actions were 
unconstitutional and illegal, the government maintained, until its collapse in early 2012, 
that it has the right to act in such ways for national security reasons. These examples 
highlight the need for clear legislation governing the use of the military for internal 
security duties.  
With the rapidly changing nature of threats to national security stemming from 
terrorism, gangs, and environmental calamities, countries around the world are 
experiencing a growing need to use their militaries for more than the traditional function 
of national defense from outside threats. The contemporary military may be employed for 
a wide range of functions: 
 
 
                                                 
152 The People’s Special Majlis, Constitution of Maldives [in Dhivehi]  (Maldives Gazette 2008), 
Article 239, 241. 
153 The People’s Special Majlis, Constitution of Maldives [in Dhivehi], Article 99. 
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(1) fight and be prepared to fight internal wars (2) fight and be prepared to 
fight internal wars (3) fight global terrorism (4) fight crime (5) provide 
peace support for humanitarian operations (6) Prepare for and execute 
peace support operations.154 
The line between domestic law enforcement and the military is blurred. Well 
established democracies with robust legislation also struggle to clearly demarcate the line 
between military and domestic law enforcement. The issue is even more problematic in 
developing democracies that lack institutional as well as legislative clarity. Like many 
other nations, the Maldives is faced with the challenge of balancing the use of military for 
domestic law enforcement duties.  
The challenge for the Maldives is twofold. First, because the military and police 
were joined together from 1971 to 2003—the period when the most development took 
place—there is an institutional history that bends the military towards law enforcement. 
This inclination is also due to the fact that the military developed with a heavy focus on 
internal security, so even after breaking into two different institutions in 2003, there is a 
temptation for the military to get involved and the executive to use the military for law 
enforcement. Additionally, due to the lack of resources and personnel, the police are not 
able to fully face all the challenges of law enforcement, especially when things get 
chaotic due to political rallies and rioting. Often the military have to be called in to assist 
in law enforcement. To facilitate the use of military for law enforcement, Clause 22 of 
the Armed Force Act of 2008 mandates that the military undertake internal security 
operations if requested by police or any other civil institutions for the purpose of 
maintaining peace and security.155 Additionally, the Police Act of 2008 in Clause 71 
stipulates that the police have the right to request military assistance in domestic law 
enforcement if it deemed necessary.156 Accordingly, the military has been used 
extensively in domestic law enforcement. From press reports it can be seen that since the 
start of the political reform process in 2004, even before the legislation, the military has 
                                                 
154 Bruneau and Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military 
Relations,” 917. 
155 The Armed Force Act of 2008 [in Dhivehi], Law no. 1/2008 (Maldives Gazette, 2008), Clause 22. 
156 The Police Act of 2008 [in Dhivehi], Law no. 5/2008 (Maldives Gazette, 2008), Clause 71. 
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been used frequently for riot control. Consequently, employment of the military in law 
enforcement has become the norm rather than the exception. 
However, the 2008 constitution, which was enacted after the Armed Force Act of 
2008 and the Police Act of 2008, clearly intends that the police and the military be 
developed independently with very different emphases. For instance, Article 240 of the 
constitution states that “The security services shall be organized as two separate services, 
and shall operate independently of each other.”157 Detailing what this means, the 
constitution further explains the focus of the military and police. According to Article 
243 “(a) The primary object of the Military Service is to defend and protect the Republic, 
its territorial integrity, its Exclusive Economic Zone and the people.”158 Additionally, 
according to Article 244, “the primary objects of the Police Service are: (a) to maintain 
public order and safety; (b) to protect and secure all people in the Maldives, and their 
property; (c) to investigate crime, conservation of evidence and prepare cases for 
disposition by the courts; and (d) to uphold the law.”159  
Even though there is a heavy emphasis in the constitution on separating the 
military and the police, and the current heavy use of military for law enforcement is 
evident, the People’s Majlis has not taken up the project of revising either the Armed 
Force Act or the Police Act to synchronize them with the intent of the constitution. 
Therefore, there is discontinuity between the constitution and the laws on the books for 
the military and the police. From a CMR perspective, this discontinuity has huge 
ramification for the professional aspect of the military. As a professional military is a key 
requirement for a healthy CMR régime, if the military is continuously drawn to and 
engaged in and domestic law enforcement, it will not have time to develop and train for 
its primary mission of war fighting and focusing on enduring threats such as international 
and domestic terrorism and various seaborne threats. To rectify the inconsistencies in 
legislation and in the use of the military and the police, the People’s Majlis must amend 
the laws, even though this may be difficult and time-consuming, and must provide 
                                                 
157 The People’s Special Majlis, Constitution of the Republic of Maldives, 114. 
158 The People’s Special Majlis, Constitution of the Republic of Maldives, 115. 
159 The People’s Special Majlis, Constitution of the Republic of Maldives, 115. 
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funding for police development so that the need for military assistance in law 
enforcement becomes the exception rather than the norm.  
C. SECURITY BLINDNESS 
Across the board there is vacuum of security knowledge in the country. There are 
few civilian staff in the MoDNS educated on security. The legislators themselves have 
limited knowledge pertaining to security, there is no research arm in the legislature, and 
no professional staffers serve the legislative committees. In total there is no adequate 
mechanism to intelligently inform the political leaders on matters of security. This 
presents a perfect storm for security blindness among elected officials. 
The lack of security knowledge is because, until 2008, anything related to security 
was a monopoly of the military. Writing about the military or questioning military 
activity was very much restricted. The People’s Majlis had no role to play in the security 
sector. Prior to the democratic transition, civic organizations were not interested and there 
was no dissenting voices on security related policies. The cumulative effect of these 
factors is that there was hardly anyone outside the uniformed military with adequate 
security knowledge. This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that people join the 
military as a lifelong career and, as the military is relatively young, there is only handful 
of ex-military retired from the officer corps.  
Therefore, moving forward there is a colossal requirement to improve the general 
security awareness among politicians. Furthermore, for the CMR institutions to function 
effectively, civilians must be educated on security and national defense. Without civilian 
security knowledge, it will be very difficult for the CMR institutions to exercise control 
and oversight, and provide independent guidance to the military.  
  63
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Maldives have a volatile political history. The sultanate era was filled with 
deposing kings, coups and counter coups by political élites. A similar trend followed in 
the republic’s early days, which were was filed with élite squabbles and attempted power 
grabs. Throughout, however, the military did not attempt to take over the state. The 
absence of a military dictatorship in the Maldives can be attributed to two factors. First, 
prior to the 1900s, the military was busy defending the country from foreign aggression 
and was very much focused in its primary mission—war fighting. Second, when the 
Maldives agreed to become a protectorate of the British Empire in 1887, and the role of 
military was diminished, the rulers refocused the military on domestic law enforcement 
and kept it weak so that it did not become a threat to their rule. Only in the late 1980s did 
the government start developing the military and its capabilities. 
Socioeconomic changes in the Maldives brought considerable development to the 
system of government and society. It is evident that the legislation, institutions and 
capabilities of CMR have shown some improvement over the years. However, these 
developments were in the context of an autocratic system with an extremely strong 
executive. Moving forward, the military needs to break free from the old mentality of 
being responsible only to the executive. In order to enact a full-fledged democratic CMR 
system and positively contribute to the fragile democratic consolidation process the 
country is going through right now, the armed force must reform itself to become 
accountable to other institutions like the legislature, the judiciary, the Auditor General, 
the media and the society at large.  
At present, the CMR institutions in the Maldives are a mixed bag of strengths and 
weaknesses. The weaknesses in CMR result from a lack of appropriate legislation, 
improper institutional configuration and across the board lack of security related 
knowledge in the political and legislative realm. Table 3 summarizes the major findings 




Control CMR Institutions Overall Score 
Institutional 
Ministry of Defense and National Security 
(MoDNS) Moderate 
National Security Council (NSC) Weak 
National Security Advisor (NSA) Weak 
Parliamentary Committees Moderate 
Oversight 
Executive Oversight Moderate 
Parliamentary Oversight Moderate 
Judicial Oversight Weak 
Civil Society Oversight Moderate 
Professionalism Recruitment and Training of Officers Weak Promotion Moderate 
Table 3.   Status of CMR institutions 
All of the CMR variables analyzed require improvement to function effectively as 
a participant in a democratic CMR régime. In the matter of institutional control, MoDNS 
and parliamentary committees have considerable powers in terms of authority; however, 
this strength is mitigated by the lack of adequate civilian staff necessary for either of 
these institutions to effectively exercise their authority. The NSC and NSA are weak in 
terms of its legislation, authority, institutional configuration, and manpower. In terms of 
the oversight function, among the executive, legislature, judiciary and civil society there 
is a willingness to exercise this function. However, oversight efforts are hindered by 
unclear legislation and lack of security related knowledge among the policy makers, 
legislature, judges and journalists. Additionally, the judiciary is burdened by a lack of 
qualified judges, especially in lower level courts. The judicial oversight function is also 
challenged by the government’s inability to enforce judicial decisions. In regards to 
professionalism, MNDF is still challenged by the task of breaking its law enforcement 
mentality. Furthermore, the effort to professionalize the military is hindered by lack of 
appropriate in-country indoctrination and professional training facilities for officers. 
From the discussion in this thesis it is evident that the Maldives faces various 
legislative, structural and manpower challenges in implementing a democratic civil-
military régime. There is an urgent requirement for the political and military leaders to do 
their part in transforming the security apparatus of the country to function effectively and 
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efficiently. Furthermore, the media and the civil society must take a more assertive role in 
educating the population about democracy in general and civil-military relations in 
particular. The following recommendations outline initiatives necessary if the Maldives 
are to develop proper civil-military relations.  
 The executive and the legislature should come up with a short-term and long-term 
defense and security strategy for the country. This should be a joint effort as the 
strategy will be the first of its kind in the Maldives.  
 The legislature must revise current security related laws and coordinate them with 
the constitution and the new security strategy. It should also clearly define the 
scope and structure of the security forces and clearly demarcate procedures for the 
domestic employment of the military.  
 The People’s Majlis must establish an independent research institute and begin 
employing professional civilian staffers for its committees to strengthen its 
understanding of security related issues. 
 Education initiatives should begin to strengthen civilian understanding of the 
security sector for civilians working in the security related institutions. This 
includes the civilian staff at the MoDNS, the President’s office, NSC, NSA, 
People’s Majlis committees and journalists reporting on security related issues.  
 The military should begin revising its principal documents, like the Code of 
Ethics, and start educating officers and the soldiers on the concept of civilian 
supremacy and the role of military in a democratic society in order to move 
beyond the current single stakeholder mentality. This includes developing new 
training doctrines and strengthening the in-country officer training system and 
professional military education. 
Progress on these fronts will help the Maldives overcome many of its current CMR 




One of the main challenges with the potential to complicate CMR is the 
Maldives’ current approach to developing its intelligence apparatus. Research has found 
that effective and transparent intelligence is a crucial element of the larger CMR régime 
because, among national security institutions, the intelligence apparatus tends to be the 
most secretive and hardest to reform.160 In recent years, the Maldives saw an exponential 
growth in the need for intelligence to address its various security threats. For example, 
the threat of international and homegrown terrorism, the use of Maldives waters for 
international smuggling operations, the increase in gang violence, and the growing 
problem of drug trafficking are challenges that require an efficient and effective 
intelligence apparatus for domestic and foreign intelligence. The Maldives’ current 
efforts to develop its intelligence function are built on thin legal grounds, mostly passing 
references in recently enacted legislation. The Armed Force Act of 2008, the Police Act 
of 2008, and the Customs Act of 2011 all make reference to intelligence. These 
references are mostly just one sentence or one clause that basically gives power to the 
institutions to “collect and analyze information” necessary to perform their assigned 
duties.161  
The current arrangements for intelligence fall far short of the threshold stipulated 
by CMR researchers in terms of legislation, oversight and accountability.162 The 
intelligence agencies are fragmented and there is no centralized mechanism for 
intelligence. There is no comprehensive legislation governing the mandates, authorities, 
types, and boundaries of intelligence agencies. There is no parliamentary committee to 
                                                 
160 Thomas C Bruneau, “Intelligence and Democratization: The Challenge of Control in New 
Democracies,” Partnership for Democratic Governance and Security, http://www.pdgs.org/pon-
bruneau.htm, accessed August, 11, 2012. 
161 The Armed Force Act of 2008 Clause 7(i) gives power to collect information and intelligence 
necessary to protect and defend sovereignty, independence and the national security of the Maldives. 
Clause 24 stipulates that MNDF should have a designated unit for intelligence collection and the collected 
information can only be given to the President, Minister of Defence, National Security Council, law 
enforcement agencies on a need-to-know basis, and to courts engaged in a trial. The Police Act of 2008 
Clause 6(13) gives the power to collect, analyze and interpret information and intelligence necessary to 
perform the duties of the Maldives Police Service. The Customs Act of 2011Clause 89 gives the authority 
to conduct surveillance within and outside Maldives to detect smuggling and contraband to and from 
Maldives, along with authority to conduct undercover and sting operations to apprehend smugglers 
162 Thomas C Bruneau and Kenneth R Dombroski, “Reforming Intelligence: The Challenge of Control 
in New Democracies,” The University of Warwick, 
www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/.../bruneau.pdf, accessed August, 14, 2012. 
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scrutinize the behavior of intelligence agencies, and is no clear legislation on collecting, 
analyzing, and disseminating intelligence. If the country continues on the current path, it 
may become extremely difficult to reform the intelligence apparatus once the different 
agencies institutionalize and established their behaviors. For the sake of avoiding a 
looming crisis of CMR, there is an urgent need for the executive and the legislature to 
reform of intelligence and create intelligence agencies governed by law with appropriate 
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